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ABSTRACT 
Individuals differ in the extent to which they feel connected to their future selves, which 
predicts time preference (i.e., preference for immediate versus delayed utility), financial 
decision-making, delinquency, and academic performance. Future self-connectedness 
may also predict how individuals compare themselves with their past selves, future 
selves, and other people. Greater connectedness may lead to more self-affirming types of 
temporal self-comparison, less self-deflating types of temporal self-comparison, and less 
social comparison. Two studies examined the relation between future self-connectedness 
and comparison processes, as well as effects on emotion, psychological adjustment, and 
motivation. In the first study, as expected, future self-connectedness positively predicted 
self-affirming temporal self-comparison and negatively predicted self-deflating temporal 
self-comparison and social comparison. In addition, future self-connectedness had 
beneficial direct and indirect effects on adjustment, emotion regulation, and motivation. 
Unlike previous research, this study examined all three components of future self-
connectedness, as opposed to only one. Exploratory analyses examined the items 
comprising the similarity-connectedness component and found that the relation of these 
items to the other variables in the model did not differ, though some of the relations in the 
model were moderated by college generation status. The second study tested whether 
increasing future self-connectedness would have similar effects on comparison, 
adjustment, emotion, and motivation. It implemented a pilot future self-connectedness 
manipulation, an established identity-stability manipulation, and a control condition. The 
!i
pilot manipulation and identity-stability manipulation failed to affect future self-
connectedness relative to control, and did not affect comparison, motivation, adjustment, 
or emotion. Future research should ascertain whether there is a causal link between 
connectedness and social comparison or temporal self-comparison processes. Overall, 
this research links future self-connectedness to social comparison and temporal self-
comparison processes, as well as well-being, emotion, and motivation, which 
demonstrates the importance of connectedness in new, important areas.  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Connected to a Better Me and Ignoring You: The Role of Future Self-Connectedness 
in Social Comparison and Temporal Self-Comparison Processes 
 We look to others all the time, especially in the goal-oriented parts of our lives, as 
they provide important information about our abilities and competencies. Consider a high 
school junior who has just received feedback on a recent test. He may think about his 
performance relative to other kids in the class, in contrast to his past scores, or compared 
to how well he wants to perform in the course (i.e., how well his future self will do). That 
is, he may compare himself to others, to his past self, or to his future self. This 
comparison may be with an individual who is doing better or doing worse than he is (i.e., 
upward or downward comparison, respectively), and the consequences of this comparison 
may differ based on the reference point. For instance, thinking about how he has done 
better in the past may be demotivating and discouraging, whereas comparing his current 
performance to how well he anticipates his future self will do may affirm his belief in his 
own abilities and help direct his behavior toward long-term goal pursuit. These social 
comparisons and temporal self-comparisons are pervasive social psychological 
phenomena and occur in many domains; the example could have just as easily invoked a 
runner and his half-marathon time, a Dilbert-type business drone and her year-end bonus, 
or a musician and his record sales. 
 In order to gain insight into these comparison processes and to build on an 
emerging body of literature, I investigate how psychological connectedness to the future 
self  (i.e., the extent to which individuals perceive overlap between current and future 
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selves, the extent to which they perceive the future self to be the same person as their 
present self) affects the selection of comparison target, which has implications for 
intrapsychic adjustment, emotion, and motivation (see Collins, 1996 for a review). I 
contend that when individuals are more connected to their future selves they compare 
themselves less to others and also engage in temporal self-comparisons that are more 
self-affirming and less self-deflating. Because research has not yet addressed the link 
between future self-connectedness and social comparison or temporal self-comparison 
processes, this work has the potential to make contributions to these literatures by 
establishing that future self-connectedness affects novel outcomes via these comparison 
processes.  
 In this dissertation, I first review the literature on future self-connectedness and 
detail the logic for why I propose a link between future self-connectedness and 
comparison processes. Second, I consider the social comparison and temporal self-
comparison literatures, leverage those insights in order to make predictions about the 
effects of future self-connectedness via comparison processes, and describe potential 
contributions of this research to the future self-connectedness and social comparison 
literatures. Third, I describe the two empirical studies in this investigation and report their 
findings. These studies address three primary aims – establish the relations among future 
self-connectedness, social comparison, and temporal self-comparison; investigate 
whether future self-connectedness affects intrapsychic adjustment, emotion, and 
motivation via these comparison processes; and test whether experimentally increasing 
  !2
future self-connectedness has corresponding effects on these comparison processes and 
downstream outcomes. 
Conceptualization of Connectedness to the Future Self 
 The philosopher Derek Parfit conceptualizes the self as a collection of distinct 
identities over time and defines connectedness to the future self as the extent to which 
individuals possess strong psychological connections, such as in the form of memories, 
beliefs, or goals – that overlap between present and future selves (Parfit, 1971; 1984; 
1986). Parfit’s theories suggest that individuals value the utility experienced by their 
future self less, holding timing constant, when they are less connected to that future self. 
That is, subjective valuation of future outcomes decreases as connectedness to future 
selves decreases. The psychological research on connectedness with the future self, much 
of it under the banner of future self-continuity (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, 
Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2009; Hershfield, 2011), draws heavily from these ideas 
and conception of the self over time.  
 The future self-continuity perspective proposes a triadic conceptualization of 
psychological connectedness to future selves, consisting of (1) positivity of the future 
self, (2) vividness of the future self, and (3) similarity to the future self (Hershfield, 
2011). Positivity facilitates continuity with future selves because if the attitude 
individuals hold toward future selves is positive (as opposed to negative), it should be 
easier to feel continuity to those future selves (e.g., Hershfield, 2011). If the future self is 
vividly imagined, individuals should feel a greater sense of connection to it (e.g., 
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Hershfield, Goldstein, Sharpe, Fox, Yeykelis, Carstensen, & Bailenson, 2011; van Gelder, 
Hershfield, & Nordgren, 2013; van Gelder, Luciano, Kranenbarg, & Hershfield, 2015). 
Individuals feel more connected to people who are similar to themselves, so feeling more 
similar to future selves should promote continuity with those future selves (e.g., Ersner-
Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2009; Bartels & Rips, 2010; 
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012).  
 Relations among components. The future self-continuity perspective theorizes 
that these three components are positively related, though there is very limited evidence 
in support of this because most of the research from this perspective focuses on only one 
of the three proposed components, and no published research to date has tested all three 
components together within a single framework. As for the supporting evidence there is, 
an experimental manipulation designed to increase future self-vividness by showing 
participants computer-aged images of themselves led to perceptions of greater similarity 
to the future self (Hershfield et al., 2011), and one study found positive associations 
among measures of liking the future self, measures of feeling connected to the future self, 
and measures of feeling similar to the future self (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009). The 
former suggests that manipulating one component positively affects another, and the 
latter suggests two of the components are positively related. Though these findings 
support positive relations among the three components, other research found no effect of 
connectedness manipulations on liking the future self or on focusing on positive 
outcomes (Bartels & Urminsky, 2013). Future research is warranted in order to more 
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clearly establish how these three components are interrelated. Another aim of this 
dissertation is to fill that gap in the literature by examining the interrelations among these 
components as well as their convergent and divergent validity.  
 Terminology. Not all research on this topic uses the term future self-continuity as 
Hershfield does. Another group of researchers refers to this construct as psychological 
connectedness to the future self and focuses on the perceived (in)stability of the 
individual’s personal identity and the traits that comprise it, with greater perceived 
stability and similarity corresponding to greater connectedness (e.g., Bartels & Rips, 
2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Bartels, Kvaran, & Nichols, 2011; Urminsky, 2017). 
Because this research takes a more integrative approach to connectedness to the future 
self and because connectedness reflects Parfit’s original meaning more than continuity 
does (Parfit, 1984, p. 206), I use the term future self-connectedness. To add clarity when 
referring to a specific component of future self-connectedness, I substitute connectedness 
with the name of that component (e.g., future self-similarity, future self-positivity, and 
future self-vividness).  
Correlates and Consequences of Future Self-Connectedness 
 Much of psychological research on future self-connectedness examines the link 
between future self-similarity and temporal discounting, demonstrating that greater 
connectedness predicts lower devaluation of future outcomes in monetary time preference 
tasks (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009), and subsequent research has replicated this finding 
(Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). This relation to temporal discounting 
  !5
tendencies extends beyond financial decisions; future self-similarity also predicts less 
myopic intertemporal decision making on discounting tasks involving good days and bad 
days on the job, extra workdays, and extra vacation days, as opposed to money (Bartels & 
Rips, 2010). Research utilizing fMRI techniques has yielded parallel findings: making 
decisions about a future self does not elicit the same activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex and rostral anterior cingulate as does making decisions about the current self, and 
the difference in activation between these brain regions for current-self-related and 
future-self-related decisions predicts subsequent measures of temporal discounting 
(Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009). Beyond its relation to discounting, 
future self-similarity predicts greater financial assets (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009), and 
having vivid mental imagery of the future self is associated with greater retirement 
preparation (Ellen, Wiener, & Fitzgerald, 2012). In addition, future self-similarity is 
positively associated with ethical business decision making and negatively associated 
with actual cheating behavior and making false promises (Hershfield et al., 2012). In the 
academic domain, future self-similarity confers positive downstream benefits in objective 
academic performance via self-control and the consideration of immediate/future 
consequences (Adelman et al., 2017) and is negatively associated with self-reported 
academic procrastination (Blouin-Hudon & Pychyl, 2015). 
 In addition to the predictive validity of future self-connectedness, research has 
found evidence that it is malleable, and several studies have utilized experimental 
manipulations to affect connectedness and its correlates. Taken together, these 
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connectedness manipulations have led to increased future self-similarity (Bartels & 
Urminsky, 2011; Joshi & Fast, 2013; Hershfield et al., 2012; Sheldon & Fishbach, 2015), 
more-patient (i.e., less-myopic) discounting behavior (Hershfield et al., 2011; Hershfield, 
2011; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), increased investment and saving on money allocation 
tasks (Hershfield et al., 2011; Bartels & Urminsky, 2015), and reduced adolescent 
delinquency (van Gelder et al., 2013; Van Gelder et al., 2015). Overall, research on future 
self-connectedness has largely focused on judgment and decision-making, temporal 
valuation, delinquency, and academic performance. It has not, however, examined 
outcomes related to well-being, emotion regulation, or comparison processes. 
Social Comparison 
 One reason to examine the link between future self-connectedness and social 
comparison is because it would connect future self-connectedness to outcomes related to 
intrapsychic adjustment and emotion. The comparison target individuals use to gauge 
their own standing – whether it’s a hypothetical other, close friend, or one’s past or future 
self – has powerful consequences for both mental health and social behaviors (Kwan et 
al., 2004; Kwan et al., 2008; Tesser, 1988; Tesser, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001; Collins, 
1996). Given emerging evidence that future self-connectedness functions to direct 
temporal attention (Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012; Adelman et al., 2017), 
connectedness may affect comparison processes by directing attention away from or 
toward particular comparison targets. In general, much of the literature finds that 
downward social comparison serves self-enhancement motives, decreases anxiety, and 
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increases self-esteem as well as positive emotion, whereas upward social comparison 
serves self-improvement motives, decreases self-evaluations, and elicits negative affect 
(e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981; Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Diener, 1984; 
Nosanchuk & Erickson, 1985; Gibbons, 1986; Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; Wheeler & 
Miyake, 1992). Linking future self-connectedness to these types of outcomes would 
represent an original contribution to this literature. 
 Individuals often employ social comparison as an information gathering strategy, 
such as to accurately assess their own ability and form competence beliefs (Festinger, 
1954; Mussweiler, 2003). Researchers describe social comparison as a “pervasive social 
phenomenon” (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002, p. 159), and its functional nature as an 
information gathering strategy has implications for when individuals use social 
comparison and temporal self-comparison. In general, but especially for those high in 
connectedness, the future self provides an important, salient, and powerful reference 
point against which to evaluate the current self. As such, those high in connectedness 
with their future selves may rely less on information about proximal others. Using 
temporal self-comparison with a future self instead of social comparison with another 
individual in the proximal environment should occur when information about the future 
self is relevant and useful. The future self provides especially useful, relevant information 
about long-term future goals and one’s capacity to attain such goals. These conditions 
make the future self a good comparison target for self-evaluation on attributes germane to 
those goals. Much of the time, however, individuals need to gather information about 
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their current self and the immediate environment. Thus, contextual and situational factors 
can make certain comparison targets more or less useful or relevant to the individual. 
 Findings from the social comparison literature lend credence to the notion that 
individuals high in connectedness may favor comparisons with their temporal selves. 
Individuals may use another person as a proxy from which to infer beliefs about their 
own abilities or gather other information and tend to use a comparison target that is 
similar to themselves (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Suls et al., 2002). 
Individuals can expect to perform similar to a proxy if they have a similar performance 
history as that proxy, which makes that proxy a more suitable target for social comparison 
(Suls et al., 2002; Suls et al., 2000; Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002; Wheeler, Martin, Suls, 
1997). Similar comparison targets provide information that tends to be more relevant and 
useful; when assessing his own athletic ability, an eighth-grade boy would find it more 
useful and informative to compare himself to other middle school boys as opposed to 
comparing himself to olympians. Individuals who are high in connectedness to future 
selves view those future selves as similar to their current selves, and that similarity may 
increase the likelihood that future selves are used as comparison targets. 
When More of Me Means Less of You 
 Further, future self-connectedness may decrease the extent to which individuals 
engage in social comparison with other people because individuals engaging in social 
comparison tend to focus on a single comparison target (Mussweiler, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 
Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998), so more comparison to future selves (or past selves) 
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would mean less comparison to others. To clarify, this means that when making a 
particular judgment, individuals tend to use a single comparison target, not that 
individuals tend to restrict themselves to a single comparison target for all social 
comparison. Also, single comparison target is not necessarily restricted to a single 
individual but could also include classes or categories of individuals. A student who is 
attempting to gauge her ability in a certain subject may compare herself to a similar 
classmate or she may compare herself to a holistic representation of students in her grade. 
As another example, a teenage boy may infer his athletic prowess via comparison with 
another boy his age, or he may instead compare himself to boys his own age. The two 
examples provide different cases of a single comparison target, even if that target is a 
group comprised of multiple individuals. To be clear, I do not suggest that high 
connectedness individuals entirely eschew comparison with others around them, but 
rather a hydraulic mechanism by which they are more likely to favor comparison with 
future selves over comparison with others under certain circumstances. 
 This hydraulic mechanism by which high-connectedness individuals compare 
themselves more to future selves and less to others may be most pronounced when both 
comparison targets could plausibly provide relevant, useful information. When 
individuals get performance feedback, for example, they can interpret this information 
relative to others or relative to future selves/goals; it is in cases like this where future self-
connectedness may lead individuals to look to their future selves and goals rather than to 
others. Consistent with this, I found that future self-connectedness buffered the effect of 
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early exam grades on subsequent grade expectations for students who performed poorly; 
low performers lowered their expectations less if they were high in future self-
connectedness (Adelman et al., manuscript submitted for publication). Part of this effect 
may have been due to high connectedness students comparing themselves less to their 
peers – they gain motivation not to give up because they focus on their positive future 
self rather than dwell on their standing relative to their peers. For those who are not 
performing well, it makes strategic sense to look less at their relative standing and instead 
focus on a more motivating reference point, such as a possible future self or goal. Future 
self-connectedness may facilitate this process and help individuals utilize social 
comparison targets that facilitate the pursuit of long-term goals. 
Temporal Self-Comparison 
 To understand the way future self-connectedness may affect how individuals 
compare themselves to their past and future selves, we must first consider temporal self-
appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001), which addresses the 
frequency of different types of temporal self-comparisons and the role of subjective 
temporal distance. This theory contends that individuals tend to engage in temporal self-
comparison in a manner that affirms positive self-regard for the present self and that this 
can be accomplished by thinking about how the past self used to be worse than it is now, 
by making downward comparisons to past selves. Wilson and Ross (2001) speculate that 
upward comparisons with future selves would similarly be self-enhancing, especially if 
those future selves are viewed as attainable. In contrast, upward comparisons with past 
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selves and downward comparisons with future selves could be considered threatening or 
self-deflating because they connote that the self has gotten worse over time or is going to 
get worse. Early work on temporal self-appraisal found that past-upward and future-
downward temporal self-comparisons were among the most infrequent types of temporal 
self-comparisons (Wilson & Ross, 2000), and as such, most of that research has focused 
on the frequent and self-enhancing past-downward type of temporal self-comparison. 
Table 1 briefly summarizes the different types of temporal self-comparison and whether 
they are self-affirming or self-deflating. 
 Future self-connectedness may direct attention to comparison targets in such a 
way that facilitates long-term goal pursuit, specifically by leading individuals to engage 
in more self-affirming temporal self-comparisons and less self-deflating temporal self-
comparisons. It may also have positive consequences for well-being and emotional 
outcomes, given that this pattern of temporal self-comparison maximizes positive self-
views and minimizes negative self-views.  
 Temporal self-appraisal theory also considers the role of subjective temporal 
distance in these processes and conceptualizes “past selves to be akin to an 
interconnected chain of different individuals who vary in closeness to the current 
self” (Wilson & Ross, 2001, p.573; Ross & Wilson, 2002). Of note, this conceptual 
approach shares similar theoretical underpinnings and assumptions as future self-
connectedness. Wilson and Ross suggest that individuals are more likely to derogate a 
distant-past self, which reflects less on the current self, and are more likely to enhance a 
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near-past self, which reflects more on the current self. Similarly, past events that reflect 
well on the current self feel subjectively closer, whereas past events that reflect poorly on 
the current self feel subjectively further away. Empirical evidence supports this notion – 
individuals view future selves more positively when they feel subjectively closer in time, 
and subjectively close future selves affect current identity more than distant future selves 
do (Wilson, Buehler, Lawford, Schmidt, Yong, 2012). This parallels, and is perhaps 
consistent with, our emerging findings that greater future self-connectedness is associated 
with reduced perceived temporal distance (Adelman et al., manuscript under review). 
This could carry important implications, especially in the academic domain, given recent 
findings that reduced psychological distance to future selves increases motivation 
(Strahan & Wilson, 2006) and performance (Peetz, Wilson, & Strahan, 2009). 
 Temporal self-comparisons affect motivation to improve (Corcoran & Peetz, 
2014), current self-evaluation (Hanko, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2010), and subjective 
temporal distance (Ross & Wilson, 2002). They can also predict changes in depression 
(Mehlsen, Thomsen, Viidik, Olesen, & Zachariae, 2005). Some of the phenomena 
predicted by temporal self-appraisal theory, however, have been shown to be moderated 
by theories of intelligence – incremental but not entity theorists judged subjectively 
distant (but not recent) past selves more harshly (Ward & Wilson, 2015) – and by self-
esteem – distancing themselves from unfavorable past selves had a greater effect on self-
views for individuals high in self-esteem (Ross & Wilson, 2002). These findings suggest 
that the tendency to denigrate past selves in order to perceive growth and view the current 
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self more favorably is more pronounced among individuals who consider personal 
growth to be possible and those who are adept at employing strategies to maintain 
positive self-regard. 
 It could be the case that high-connectedness individuals invoke the future self a 
“routine standard” in comparison processes. Routine standards are comparison targets 
that have been used in the past for self-evaluation and become the default reference point 
(Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003). Evidence from the social comparison literature suggests that 
individuals do not necessarily engage in a complex, deliberative process to select a 
comparison target and instead may use an automatic, efficient process of utilizing  such 
routine standards. High connectedness individuals may habitually compare themselves to 
where they want to be and their goals (upward future selves) or to how much they have 
grown and progressed (downward past selves). Following this, I expect that 
connectedness predicts stable individual differences in engaging in temporal self-
comparison.  
Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Research Overview 
 Assumptions. I make two important assumptions in this research. First, I assume 
a relatively stable environment in which individuals generally have a predictable future. 
Future self-connectedness may only have these predicted effects on comparison, emotion, 
adjustment, and motivation – or its effects documented in the literature – in relatively 
stable environments in which focusing on the future provides adaptive benefits. It 
remains an empirical question what the boundary conditions of the effects of future self-
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connectedness are, though it is reasonable to assert (low) predictability of the future and 
(low) usefulness of valuing future outcomes would contribute to such boundary 
conditions. 
 Second, I assume that individuals possess a self-concept, representations and 
beliefs about themselves, including self-schemas and conceptions of their past, present, 
and possible future selves (Markus, 1977; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 
1987). That is, individuals have cognitive conceptions of their future selves and differ in 
their perceptions and attitudes toward those future selves. This research makes no explicit 
assumptions or claims about what “The Self” is. Rather, this research focuses on how 
individuals feel and perceive connection to their future selves. 
 Hypothesis 1. Future self-connectedness is negatively related to self-deflating 
temporal self-comparisons (i.e., upward comparisons with the past self and downward 
comparisons with the future self) and positively related to self-affirming temporal self-
comparisons (i.e., downward comparisons to the past self and upward comparisons with 
the future self), and negatively associated with overall social comparison tendencies.  
 Hypothesis 2. Future self-connectedness has positive downstream consequences 
for motivation, emotion regulation, and psychological adjustment through its relations to 
social comparison and temporal self-comparison processes. 
 Hypothesis 3. There is a causal relation between connectedness and comparison 
processes. I anticipate that experimentally manipulating future self-connectedness also 
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affects social comparison and temporal self-comparison as well as affective, adjustment, 
and motivational outcomes in a manner corresponding to the correlational findings. 
 Overview. For this dissertation, I test these hypotheses in two studies. I separate 
Study 1 into two parts, Study 1A and 1B. Study 1A tests and establishes the relations 
among individual differences in future self-connectedness, social comparison, and 
temporal self-comparison. Study 1B examines the downstream consequences of future 
self-connectedness via social comparison and temporal self-comparison. Studies 1A and 
1B come from the same longitudinal study, which was part of a larger study for our IES 
research (IES, 2016). Specifically, I test the indirect effects of future self-connectedness 
on well-being and emotion regulation via temporal self-comparison and social 
comparison tendencies. Study 2 tests Hypothesis 3 by manipulating future self-
connectedness and then assessing effects on social comparison, temporal self-
comparison, emotion, well-being, and motivation.  
Study 1 Method 
Design 
 This study piggybacked on a larger multi-wave longitudinal study, which was part 
of an ongoing IES research project (IES, 2016). I included measures as part of that study 
which would allow testing of hypotheses for this investigation. The measures used in this 
investigation were administered during the first week of the study (Time 1), the 28th week 
of the study (Time 2), and the 52nd week of the study (Time 3). 
Participants 
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 This larger research study targeted first-year students enrolled in introductory 
chemistry or psychology courses, so the sample is restricted to first-year students who 
were recruited for return waves; non first-year students were not present for the waves 
which included the comparison measures. The study included 890 ASU first-year 
undergraduate students. Of these 890 students, 499 (56.1%) were female, and 391 
(43.9%) were male. Of the 879 students who reported their parents’ educational 
attainment, 273 (30.7%) were first-generation college students, and 606 (68.1%) were 
continuing-generation college students. The three largest ethnic groups were White 
(56.2%, n = 500), Asian (10.3%, n = 92), and Latino or Latina (19.7%, n = 175). The 
mean age of the sample was 18.14 years old (90.4% of the sample was 18 years old), 
based on age during participants’ first wave participated in.  
 Breakdown by time. At Time 1, 307 (55.9%) of participants were female and 242 
(44.1%) were male; 166 (30.2%) were first-generation and 375 (68.3%) were continuing-
generation college students; 313 (57.0%) were White, 56 (10.2%) were Asian, and 116 
(21.1%) were Latino or Latina; and 511 (93.1%) were 18 years old, 27 (4.9%) were 19 
years old, and the mean age was 18.12 years old. At Time 2, 320 (60.7%) of participants 
were female and 207 (39.3%) were male; 162 (30.7%) were first-generation and 359 
(68.1%) were continuing-generation college students; 294 (55.8%) were White, 63 
(12.0%) were Asian, and 95 (18.0%) were Latino or Latina; and 490 (93.0%) were 18 
years old, 31 (5.9%) were 19 years old, and the mean age was 18.10 years old. At Time 3, 
306 (61.8%) of participants were female and 189 (38.2%) were male; 144 (29.1%) were 
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first-generation and 343 (69.3%) were continuing-generation college students; 273 
(55.2%) were White, 59 (11.9%) were Asian, and 92 (18.6%) were Latino or Latina; and 
452 (91.3%) were 18 years old, 36 (7.3%) were 19 years old, and the mean age was 18.13 
years old. Of the participants who were in Time 1, 351 (63.9%) returned for Time 2, and 
327 (59.5%) returned for Time 3.  
Measures  
 First, Study 1 included measures of all three components of future self-
connectedness, as well as measures of social comparison and temporal self-comparison. 
This allowed the test of the hypotheses concerning the relation between connectedness 
and comparison processes. Second, a major goal of this investigation is to examine 
whether future self-connectedness predicts well-being and affective outcomes. To be able 
to test this, Study 1 included measures of emotion regulation (Gross & John, 2003), 
meaning in life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), satisfaction with life (Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), and self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; Robins, Hendin, 
Trzesniewski, 2001). In addition, there were measures of academic self-efficacy 
(Chemers et al., 2001), academic valuing and disengagement (Martin, 2007; Martin, 
2009), and various items related to academics such as performance expectations and 
likelihood of graduation. As part of the larger study, Study 1 included other measures 
which are not discussed here; I only mention and describe measures relevant to this 
investigation. Table 2 details which measures for this research appear in which waves. 
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 Future Self-Connectedness. Study 1 included two-item measures of the three 
components of future self-connectedness. To assess similarity-connectedness, included an 
adapted version of an existing measure of future self-connectedness (Ersner-Hershfield et 
al., 2009) based on the inclusion of other in the self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). 
Participants responded to two items on a 7-point scale to indicate how similar (1 = not at 
all similar to my future self, 7 = very similar to my future self) and how connected (1 = 
not at all connected to my future self, 7 = very connected to my future self) they felt to 
their future selves ten years from now. Following previous research (e.g., Bryan & 
Hershfield, 2013), I averaged the two items, r (547) = .40, forming an aggregate measure 
of connectedness.  
 The two vividness items, also on a 7-point scale, asked participants When you 
imagine your future self, how vividly do you picture it? (1 = not at all vividly; I do not 
have a clear image in my head of my future self, 7 = very vividly; I have a very clear 
image in my head of my future self) and How easy is it for you to visualize a mental 
picture of your future self? (1 = Very difficult, 7 = Very easy). I averaged the two items, r 
(547) = .80, to form an aggregate measure of future self-vividness.  
 For the first positivity item, participants responded to the prompt When I think 
about the future, my future self feels… by dragging a 0-100 slider; 0-20 was labeled very 
negative, 20-40 was labeled negative, 40-60 was labeled neutral, 60-80 labeled positive, 
and 80-100 was labeled very positive. The second positivity item was adapted from one 
used in previous research (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009) and asked participants How 
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much do you like your future self five years after graduating from college? (1 = don’t like 
at all, 7 = like as much as possible). These two items were standardized and averaged, r 
(546) = .48, to form the future self-positivity measure for this study.  
 Social Comparison and Temporal Self-Comparison. In order to understand 
social and temporal-self comparison processes, and to be able to test the hypotheses this 
dissertation puts forth, we must understand how these processes differ by comparison 
direction and by target. For this dissertation, I developed an original measure of social 
and temporal self-comparison because existing measures of social comparison do not 
adequately vary direction of comparison (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) and existing 
measures of temporal self-comparison involve content coding open-ended responses 
(e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2000).  
 To create this measure, I identified the major comparison targets of interest – 
other people, the past self, and the future self – and the different possible directions of 
comparison – upward, downward, and unspecified. This resulted in nine possible 
permutations, such as downward past self-comparison, upward future self-comparison, 
and upward social comparison. For each of the nine permutations, I drafted 3-5 items to 
assess the extent to which individuals compare themselves (their present selves) to these 
targets. These items included both general items and academic-specific items for each 
category. Table 3 details for each subscale the number of items, reliability at Time 2, and 
a sample item. With one exception, all reliabilities were above Cronbach’s α = .70. For 
the downward future self-comparison subscale, Cronbach’s α = .62. When the item 
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sometimes I think things may go downhill from here was deleted, however, Cronbach’s α 
increased to .71. 
 Emotion regulation. To assess emotion regulation, Study 1 included the 
reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), 
which taps into the extent to which individuals control their emotions by interpreting an 
emotion-eliciting stimulus in such a way that changes its affective consequences. On this 
six-item measure, Cronbach’s α = .81, participants responded to such items as I control 
my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. Reappraisal was associated with better interpersonal 
functioning, the experience of more positive emotion, and the expression of more positive 
emotion. 
 Well-being. To assess well-being, Study 1 included the Satisfaction with Life 
Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), which measures the extent to which 
individuals are satisfied with their life. Participants respond to five items such as in most 
ways my life is close to my ideal on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale, 
Cronbach’s α = .86. 
 Self-esteem. Study 1 included the single-item measure of self-esteem (Robins, 
Hendin, Trzesniewski, 2001). Participants respond to I have high self-esteem on a 1 (not 
very true of me) to 5 (very true of me) scale. In addition, Study 1 included the classic 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), in which participants indicate their 
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agreement to 10 items such as I feel that I'm a person of worth on a 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree) scale, Cronbach’s α = .90. 
 Academic motivation. To measure the extent to which students believed in their 
own competence, Study 1 included an established measure of academic self-efficacy 
(Chemers et al., 2001), Cronbach’s α = .87. On this measure, participants responded to 
eight items such as I usually do very well in school and at academic tasks on a 1 (very 
untrue) to 7 (very true) scale. In addition, Study 1 included two subscales from the 
Motivation and Engagement Scale for University/College (Martin, 2007; Martin, 2009). 
The academic valuing subscale assessed the extent to which students value what they are 
learning in college and contains four items, Cronbach’s α = .83. Participants indicated 
their agreement with statements such as it’s important to understand what I’m taught at 
college on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. The academic 
disengagement subscale, in contrast, measured the extent to which students have given up 
and don’t exert effort anymore in school. Participants responded to four items such as I 
don’t really care about college anymore on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale, Cronbach’s α = .87. Students also reported their expected GPA for that semester as 
well their perceptions of the likelihood they would graduate from college.  
Study 1 Analytic Approach and Results 
Data Analytic Approach 
 Study 1A tests the hypothesis that future self-connectedness predicts social 
comparison and temporal self-comparison, such that greater connectedness is associated 
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with less social comparison, less self-deflating temporal self-comparison, more self-
affirming temporal self-comparison. To examine the relations among future self-
connectedness, social comparison, and temporal self-comparison, the primary analyses 
for this study are the zero-order correlations among these constructs. To gain temporal 
precedence, these analyses use the three measures of future self-connectedness at Time 1 
and measures of comparison at Time 2, 28 weeks later. In addition, Time 2 occurred right 
after most students received feedback on their first round of midterms during their second 
semester, a time in the semester when social comparison and temporal self-comparison 
would be especially salient and meaningful. The connectedness, vividness, and positivity 
components of future self-connectedness are analyzed and described separately, as are the 
individual subscales of the comparison measures (e.g., past-downward temporal self-
comparison).  
 Study 1B builds a structural equation model to test whether future self-
connectedness has downstream effects on emotion, adjustment, and motivation and 
whether there were indirect effects via social comparison and temporal self-comparison. 
Figure 1 depicts a simplified version of the structural model for this SEM, emphasizing 
the primary hypotheses being tested. Analysis of this SEM is conducted in MPlus, 
Version 8, implementing full information maximum likelihood (FIML) to handle any 
missing data. The model fit indices include the chi-square test, the root-mean-square error 
of approximation (RMSEA), the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR), and 
the comparative fit index (CFI). Based on conventions from the literature, model fit is 
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considered acceptable when RMSEA < .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), CFI > .95, and 
SRMR < .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
 Paths in the SEM. In the structural equation model, the two measures of future 
self-connectedness predict the three comparison measures and the three outcome 
measures, and the three comparison measures predict the three outcome variables of 
adjustment, emotion regulation, and motivation. In addition, this SEM models the 
relations among the future self-connectedness measures, among the comparison 
measures, and among the three outcome variables. To test the effects of future self-
connectedness on adjustment, emotion, and motivation, I examine both the direct links 
between future self-connectedness and these measures as well as the indirect effects via 
social comparison, self-deflating temporal self-comparison, and self-affirming temporal 
self-comparison. Figure 2 illustrates the variables and paths in this structural equation 
model.  
 Comparison measures in the SEM. The SEM for Study 1B includes the 
aggregate measure of the 11 social comparison items at Time 2, Cronbach’s α = .91; an 
aggregate measure of the nine self-affirming temporal self-comparison items at Time 2, 
Cronbach’s α = .87; and an aggregate measure of the seven self-deflating temporal self-
comparison items at Time 2, Cronbach’s α = .82. 
 Primary outcome measures in the SEM. The SEM for Study 1B includes three 
primary outcomes measures of interest – emotion regulation, psychological adjustment, 
and academic motivation. The emotion regulation measure is the observed scale score at 
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Time 3. To assess psychological adjustment, the SEM includes a latent variable 
consisting of Time 3 satisfaction with life, Time 3 Rosenberg self-esteem, and Time 3 
single-item self-esteem. To assess academic motivation, the SEM includes a latent 
variable consisting of Time 2 academic self-efficacy, Time 2 academic valuing, Time 2 
academic disengagement, Time 2 expected GPA, and Time 2 graduation likely. I examine 
the measurement model for this latent variable before proceeding with further analyses to 
confirm these measures adequately hang together. There is reason to expect they may not; 
academic self-efficacy, academic valuing, and academic disengagement represent more 
psychological constructs, whereas expected GPA and likelihood of graduations represent 
goals and likelihood judgments.  
Study 1A Results 
 Connectedness and social comparison with peers. As expected, most of the 
future self-connectedness measures were negatively related to social comparison. The 
aggregate vividness measure predicted the social comparison aggregate, r(334) = -.21, p 
< .001, as well as all three subscales, |r|s ranged from .14 to .22, ps < .009. The aggregate 
positivity measure also predicted social comparison, r(334) = -.20, p < .001, and all three 
of its subscales, |r|s ranged from .11 to .24, ps < .04. The similarity-connectedness 
aggregate measure did not predict the aggregate measure of social comparison, r(334) = 
-.04, p = .52, nor the three subscales of social comparison (upward, downward, direction 
unspecified), |r|s ranged from .002 to .07, ps > .23. 
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 Connectedness and temporal self-comparison. With the exception of one 
relation, all measures of future self-connectedness were significantly related to the four 
temporal self-comparison subscales of interest – past-downward, past-upward, future 
downward, and future-upward – in the predicted direction. Whereas I had specific 
predictions for the directional subscales, I did not have strong predictions for the non-
directional subscales. The similarity-connectedness measure predicted past-downward 
temporal self-comparison, r(334) = .13, p = .02; past-upward temporal self-comparison, 
r(334) = -.15, p = .006; and future-downward temporal self-comparison, r(333) = -.14, p 
= .008. It did not predict future-upward temporal self-comparison, r(333) = .07, p = .21; 
direction-unspecified past temporal self-comparison, r(333) = .01, p = .83; and direction-
unspecified future temporal self-comparison, r(334) = .01, p = .80. The vividness 
aggregate predicted the four temporal self-comparison measures of interest, |r|s ranged 
from .18 to .23, ps ≤ .001, and also direction-unspecified future temporal self-
comparison, r(334) = .29, p < .001. It did not predict direction-unspecified past temporal 
self-comparison, r(333) = .01, p = .85. Similarly, the positivity aggregate predicted the 
four temporal self-comparison measures of interest, |r|s ranged from .17 to .36, ps ≤ .002, 
and direction-unspecified future temporal self-comparison, r(334) = .14, p = .009, but did 
not predict direction-unspecified past temporal self-comparison, r(333) < .001, p = .998. 
 Social comparison and temporal self-comparison. The social comparison 
aggregate measure was positively related to most of the measures of temporal self-
comparison (see Table 4). It was related to past-upward temporal self-comparison, r(501) 
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= .18, p < .001; future-downward temporal self-comparison, r(501) = .30, p < .001; and 
direction-unspecified past temporal self-comparison, r(501) = .30, p < .001; but not to  
past-downward temporal self-comparison, r(502) = .08, p = .06, future-upward temporal 
self-comparison, r(501) = .07, p = .11; or to direction-unspecified future temporal self-
comparison, r(502) = -.04, p = .40. The three subscales of social comparison exhibited a 
similar pattern in their relations to temporal self-comparison, except that direction-
unspecified social comparison was not related to past-downward temporal self-
comparison, r(502) = .05, p = .30. 
Study 1B Results 
 As a preliminary test of whether connectedness and comparison matter to the 
primary outcomes of interest, I first examined the zero-order correlations of future self-
connectedness, temporal self-comparison, and social comparison with emotion 
regulation, adjustment, and academic motivation, testing the same measures as in the 
SEM.  
 Future self-connectedness. Overall, the measures of future self-connectedness 
were related to emotion regulation, well-being, and motivation as expected. The 
similarity-connectedness aggregate measure predicted emotion regulation r(319) = .20, p 
< .001; single-item self-esteem, r(318) = .27, p < .001; Rosenberg self-esteem, r(316) = .
29, p < .001; satisfaction with life, r(317) = .24, p < .001; academic self-efficacy, r(342) 
= .19, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(340) = -.24, p < .001; and expected GPA, 
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r(337) = .15, p = .006. It was not related to academic valuing, r(340) = .06, p = .24, or 
graduation likelihood, r(336) = .07, p = .19.  
 The vividness aggregate measure predicted emotion regulation, r(319) = .13, p = .
024; single-item self-esteem, r(318) = .17, p < .001; Rosenberg self-esteem, r(316) = .22, 
p < .001; satisfaction with life, r(317) = .10, p < .001; academic self-efficacy, r(342) = .
25, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(340) = -.24, p < .001; and graduation 
likelihood, r(336) = .12, p = .001, though it was not related to academic valuing, r(340) = 
.08, p = .13, or to expected GPA, r(337) = .08, p = .16.  
 The positivity aggregate measure predicted emotion regulation, r(319) = .25, p < .
001; single-item self-esteem, r(318) = .30, p < .001; Rosenberg self-esteem, r(316) = .36, 
p < .001; satisfaction with life, r(317) = .28, p < .001; academic self-efficacy, r(342) = .
25, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(340) = -.29, p < .001; academic valuing, r(340) 
= .43, p = .006; graduation likelihood, r(336) = .18, p = .001; and expected GPA, r(337) = 
.17, p = .001.  
 All three measures of future self-connectedness predicted the measures of 
emotion regulation and psychological adjustment, as well as academic self-efficacy and 
academic disengagement. In addition, positivity predicted academic valuing, positivity 
and vividness predicted likelihood of graduation, and positivity and similarity-
connectedness predicted expected GPA. The measures motivation were administered 28 
weeks after the measures of connectedness, and the measures of emotion regulation and 
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well-being were administered 52 weeks after connectedness. This underscores the 
predictive value of future self-connectedness and its relation to these outcomes.  
 Temporal self-comparison. Across the board, self-affirming and self-deflating 
temporal self-comparison were related to emotion regulation, motivation, and well-being 
as predicted. Self-affirming temporal self-comparison was correlated with emotion 
regulation, r(388) = .22, p < .001; single-item self-esteem, r(387) = .15, p = .002; 
Rosenberg self-esteem, r(387) = .18, p < .001; satisfaction with life, r(387) = .12, p = .02; 
academic self-efficacy, r(502) = .34, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(502) = -.33, p 
< .001; academic valuing, r(502) = .43, p < .001; graduation likelihood, r(500) = .25, p 
< .001; and expected GPA, r(502) = .14, p = .003. Similarly, though in the opposite 
direction, self-deflating temporal self-comparison was related to emotion regulation, 
r(388) = -.19, p < .001; single-item self-esteem, r(387) = -.19, p < .001; Rosenberg self-
esteem, r(387) = -.39, p < .001; satisfaction with life, r(387) = -.28 p < .001; academic 
self-efficacy, r(502) = -.41, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(502) = .49, p < .001; 
academic valuing, r(502) = -.30, p < .001; graduation likelihood, r(500) = -.24, p < .001; 
and expected GPA, r(502) = -.32, p < .001. 
 Social comparison. The aggregate measure of social comparison with peers was 
correlated with emotion regulation, r(388) = -.15, p = .004; Rosenberg self-esteem, 
r(387) = -.21, p < .001; academic disengagement , r(502) = .11, p = .01; and expected 
GPA, r(502) = .11, p = .02. Social comparison was not, however, related to single-item 
self-esteem, r(387) = -.09, p = .08; graduation likelihood, r(500) = .08, p = .06; 
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satisfaction with life, r(387) = -.03, p = .55; academic self-efficacy, r(502) = .02, p = .74; 
or academic valuing, r(502) = .03, p = .57. Social comparison was not as strongly or 
consistently related to these outcomes as were future self-connectedness and temporal 
self-comparison, though still associated with some of them (see Table 5).  
Academic Motivation Measurement Model  
 In order to validate the academic motivation latent variable, I examined its 
measurement model. The measurement model with five indicators – academic self-
efficacy, academic valuing, academic disengagement, expected GPA, and likelihood of 
graduation – exhibited poor fit3, 𝜒2(5) = 58.44, p < .001, RMSEA = .144, CFI = .912, 
SRMR = .051. The lowest factor loadings were expected GPA, b* = .49, and graduation 
likely, b* = .55, compared to self-efficacy, b* = .76, disengagement, b* = -.70, and 
valuing, b* = .60 (NB: standardized coefficients are denoted with a *). These two 
indicators showing the lowest loadings are conceptually different from the other three, as 
expected GPA and graduation likelihood represent goals and judgments, whereas self-
efficacy, valuing, and disengagement are more psychological in nature. Because of this, I 
opted to use academic self-efficacy, valuing, and disengagement as the indicators for this 
latent variable there are no fit indices because this measurement model is saturated. 
 Primary Structural Equation Model  
 I tested the primary structural equation model as described in the analytic 
approach, with the exception of the change to the academic motivation latent variable 
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described in the preceding paragraph. This model showed good fit to these data (see 
Figure 2), 𝜒2(36) = 113.49, p < .001, RMSEA = .053, CFI = .948, SRMR = .04, 
 Paths from future self-connectedness4. The three measures of future self-
connectedness were all related to one another. The similarity-connectedness measure was 
correlated with vividness, Ψ = .53, Ψ* = .30, p < .001, and with positivity, Ψ = .28, Ψ* = .
28, p < .001. The vividness and positivity measures were also related to each other, Ψ = .
59, Ψ* = .46, p < .001.  
 Similarity-connectedness. Similarity-connectedness was not related to social or 
temporal-self comparison, but it predicted the three outcomes of interest. The similarity-
connectedness measure predicted academic motivation, ɣ = .06, ɣ* = .11, p = .05; emotion 
regulation, ɣ = .08, ɣ* = .13, p = .02; and psychological adjustment, ɣ = .12, ɣ* = .20, p 
< .001. It did not, however, predict social comparison, ɣ = .06, ɣ* = .06, p = .26; self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, ɣ = .005, ɣ* = .007, p = .91; or self-deflating 
temporal self-comparison, ɣ = -.04, ɣ* = -.04, p = .44.  
 Vividness. Vividness predicted social comparison and self-affirming temporal self-
comparison, but not self-deflating temporal self-comparison or any of the outcomes. 
Future self-vividness predicted social comparison, ɣ = -.12, ɣ* = -.16, p = .007, and self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, ɣ = .08, ɣ* = .13, p = .03, but it did not predict self-
deflating temporal self-comparison, ɣ = -.08, ɣ* = -.11, p = .051; and psychological 
adjustment, ɣ = -.02, ɣ* = -.04, p = .56; academic motivation, ɣ = .01, ɣ* =.03, p = .65, or 
emotion regulation ɣ = -.03, ɣ* = -.07, p = .28. 
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 Positivity. Positivity predicted all three comparison measures, psychological 
adjustment, and emotion regulation, but not academic motivation. Future self-positivity 
predicted social comparison, ɣ = -.19, ɣ* = -.15, p = .01; self-affirming temporal self-
comparison, ɣ = .22, ɣ* = .20, p < .001; self-deflating temporal self-comparison, ɣ = - .30, 
ɣ* = -.24, p < .001; emotion regulation ɣ = .12, ɣ* =.15, p = .02; and psychological 
adjustment, ɣ = .21, ɣ* = .26, p < .001, but it did not predict academic motivation, ɣ = .03, 
ɣ* =.05, p = .45. 
 Paths among comparison measures and outcomes. The three comparison 
measures were all related to each other in the predicted directions, and the three outcomes 
were all positively related. Social comparison was positively related to both self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, Ψ = .17, Ψ* = .18, p < .001, and self-deflating 
temporal self-comparison, Ψ = .23, Ψ* = .20, p < .001. Self-deflating and self-affirming 
temporal self-comparison were negatively related to one another, Ψ = -.19, Ψ* = -.20, p 
< .001. Academic motivation was related to adjustment, Ψ = .11, Ψ* = .40, p < .001, and 
emotion regulation, Ψ = .11, Ψ* = .17, p = .02, and emotion regulation was related to 
adjustment, Ψ = .16, Ψ* = .42, p < .001. 
 Comparison and outcomes. There were differences among which outcomes each 
type of comparison predicted. Of the main outcomes of interest, social comparison only 
predicted worse emotion regulation, β = -.07, β* = -.12, p = .03, and was not related to 
academic motivation, β = .04, β* = .07, p = .16, or adjustment, β = -.05, β* = -.08, p = .
14. Self-deflating temporal self-comparison predicted academic motivation, β = -.27, β* 
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= -.47, p < .001, and adjustment, β = -.16, β* = -.26, p < .001, but not emotion regulation, 
β = -.04, β* = -.06, p = .26. Self-affirming temporal self-comparison predicted emotion 
regulation, β = .12, β* = .16, p = .002, and academic motivation, β = .23, β* = .34, p < .
001, but not adjustment, β = .03, β* = .03, p = .52. To describe it from the outcomes side, 
psychological adjustment was predicted by self-deflating temporal self-comparison, 
emotion regulation was predicted by social comparison and by self-affirming temporal 
self-comparison, and academic motivation was related to both types of temporal self-
comparison. 
 Indirect Effects. Positivity had downstream effects on emotion regulation via 
self-affirming temporal self-comparison, on adjustment via self-deflating temporal self-
comparison, and on academic motivation via both types of temporal self-comparison, 
whereas vividness only had downstream effects on academic motivation through self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, and similarity-connectedness was not related to 
social comparison and had no indirect effects on the outcomes of interest via social 
comparison. Future self-vividness had an indirect effect on academic motivation via self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, estimate = .02, SEest. = .009, est.* = .04,  SE*est. = .
02, p = .04. Future self-positivity had indirect effects on academic motivation via self-
affirming temporal self-comparison, estimate = .05, SEest. = .02, est.* = .07,  SE*est. = .02, 
p = .001, and via self-deflating temporal self-comparison, estimate = .08, SEest. = .02, 
est.* = .11,  SE*est. = .03, p < .001. Positivity also had an indirect effect on emotion 
regulation via self-affirming temporal self-comparison, estimate = .03, SEest. = .01, est.* = 
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.03,  SE*est. = .01, p = .02, and on psychological adjustment via self-deflating temporal 
self-comparison,; estimate = .04, SE = .02, est.* = .06,  SE*est. = .02, p = .001. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Similarity vs. connectedness. One potential issue with this investigation is the 
grouping of two similarity-connectedness items. Not all research using this measure has 
taken the average of the two items (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009). Similarity to the 
future self and connectedness to the future self may represent distinct psychological 
constructs. In addition, similarity to the future self may have a less-positive meaning or 
less-positive connotation for certain individuals, such as low-SES individuals who are 
aiming for upward mobility and a future self who is different from who they have been, at 
least on certain dimensions.  
 To explore these issues, I examined the relations of single-item similarity and 
connectedness to the measures of comparison and to the outcomes of interest. In addition 
to testing the bivariate correlations (see Table 6), I constructed a SEM similar to the 
primary model, except that it replaced the future self-connectedness measures with 
single-item future self-similarity and single-item future self-connectedness (see Figure 3). 
This model showed good fit to these data, 𝜒2(32) = 106.76, p < .001, RMSEA = .056, CFI 
= .947, SRMR = .042. As expected, similarity and connectedness were related, Ψ = .79, 
Ψ* = .40, p < .001. Similarity predicted psychological adjustment ɣ = .08, ɣ* = .15, p = .
02, but was not related to the other outcomes or to the comparison measures. 
Connectedness also predicted adjustment, ɣ = .07, ɣ* = .15, p = .01. In addition, it 
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predicted self-affirming temporal self-comparison, ɣ = .09, ɣ* = .15, p = .009 , and self-
deflating temporal self-comparison, ɣ = -.12, ɣ* = -.17, p = .002. To test whether 
connectedness and similarity differed in their relations to the other variables in the model, 
I tested a series of models in which the path from similarity and connectedness to each of 
the other variables in the model was constrained to be equal. None of these constrained 
models led to worse fit (see Table 7), suggesting that, at least within this model, similarity 
and connectedness did not differ in the extent to which they predicted social comparison, 
temporal self-comparison, adjustment, motivation, or emotion regulation. This supports 
the using the average of these two items for the similarity-connectedness aggregate 
measure.  
 College generation status. In addition, I ran a version of this model stacked by 
college generation status (see Figure 4), which showed acceptable fit by most indices, 𝜒2(32) = 181.04, p < .001, RMSEA = .064, CFI = .921, SRMR = .079. To test whether 
college generation status moderated any of the paths in the model, I ran a model which 
constrained all paths to be equal between the two groups (e.g., the path between future 
self-similarity and self-affirming for first-generation college students was constrained to 
equal the same path for continuing-generation college students), and then ran a series of 
models which removed this constraint for each path in the model, one at a time (see Table 
8). These analyses revealed that college generation status moderated five paths in the 
model: the relation between similarity and connectedness, self-affirming temporal self-
comparison predicted from future self-similarity, social comparison predicted from future 
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self-connectedness, emotion regulation predicted from future self-connectedness, 
psychological adjustment predicted from self-affirming temporal self-comparison, and 
psychological adjustment predicted from self-deflating temporal self-comparison.  
 Moderated paths5. In the model, five paths were moderated by college generation 
status; some of these relations were stronger for first-generation college students, and 
some were stronger for continuing-generation college students (see paths in black in 
Figure 4). The relation between similarity and connectedness was stronger for first-
generation students Ψ = 1.06, Ψ* = .50, p < .001, than for continuing-generation college 
students, Ψ = .58, Ψ* = .32, p < .001. The path between similarity and self-affirming 
temporal self-comparison was nonsignificant for both groups but was more positive for 
first-generation college students, ɣ = .13, ɣ* = .19, p = .11, and more negative for 
continuing-generation college students, ɣ = -.07, ɣ* = -.09, p = .42. The path from 
connectedness to emotion regulation was moderated by college generation status such 
that it was stronger for first-generation college students, ɣ = .15, ɣ* = .33, p = .003, and 
weaker and nonsignificant for continuing-generation college students, ɣ = -.004, ɣ* = -.
009, p = .89. Similarly, both moderated paths predicting psychological adjustment were 
stronger for first-generation students. The path from self-deflating temporal self-
comparison to psychological adjustment was stronger for first-generation, β = -.20, β* = -.
30, p = .002, than for continuing-generation college students, β = -.16, β* = -.28, p < .001. 
The path from self-affirming temporal self-comparison to psychological adjustment was 
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also stronger for first-generation college students, β = .18, β* = .22, p = .02, and weaker 
and nonsignificant for continuing-generation college students, β = .01, β* = .02, p = .81.  
 Interactive effects. Though the structural equation model in Study 1B addressed 
the effects of each component of future self-connectedness when controlling for the other 
two, it did not examine whether the components of future self-connectedness interact 
with each other to predict comparison processes, adjustment, motivation, or emotion 
regulation. As discussed previously, the relations among the components of future self-
connectedness are not well established in the literature, and no published work has tested 
whether the effects of these components are redundant, additive, or interactive. I ran a 
series of analyses in multiple regression to test whether each possible pairing of the 
components of connectedness (i.e., positivity*vividness, vividness*similarity-
connectedness, similarity-connectedness*positivity) interacted to affect comparison 
processes or the outcomes of interest, and each analysis also included the appropriate 
lower-order terms. These analyses examined the following criteria: social comparison, 
past-downward temporal self-comparison, past-upward temporal self-comparison, future-
downward temporal self-comparison, future-upward temporal self-comparison, emotion 
regulation, satisfaction with life, Rosenberg self-esteem, single-item self-esteem, 
academic self-efficacy, academic valuing, academic disengagement, expected GPA, and 
graduation likelihood. All but two of these analyses revealed nonsignificant effects of the 
interactions between the components of connectedness on comparison processes and the 
outcomes of interest. This lends support to treating the components of connectedness and 
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separate though interrelated in the analyses. The only significant effects were the 
interaction of positivity and similarity-connectedness predicting past-downward temporal 
self-comparison and the interaction of vividness and similarity-connectedness also 
predicting past-downward temporal self-comparison. 
 Vividness*similarity-connectedness. Vividness and similarity interacted to predict 
past-downward temporal self-comparison, F(3, 332) = 7.60, p < .001, RSQ = .06; β0 = 
5.35; βVIV = .11, β*VIV = .11, t(332) = 2.45, p = .01; βFSC = .08, β*FSC = .08, t(332) = 1.42, 
p = .16; βFSC*VIV = -.10, β*FSC*VIV = -.15, t(332) = -2.76, p = .006. At low levels of 
similarity-connectedness, the relation between vividness and past-downward temporal 
self-comparison was stronger and significant, β0 = 5.25; βVIV = .23, β*VIV = .29, t(332) = 
4.09, p < .001, whereas this relation was weaker and nonsignificant at high levels of 
similarity-connectedness, β0 = 5.45; βVIV = .001, β*VIV = .001, t(332) = .017, p = .99 (see 
Figure 5). At low levels of vividness, the relation between similarity-connectedness and 
past-downward temporal self-comparison was stronger and significant, β0 = 5.18; βFSC = .
22, β*FSC = .22, t(332) = 2.74, p = .007, whereas this relation was weaker and 
nonsignificant at high levels of similarity-connectedness, β0 = 5.52; βFSC = -.06, β*FSC = -.
06, t(332) = -.766, p = .44 (see Figure 6). 
 Positivity*similarity-connectedness. Positivity and similarity-connectedness 
interacted to predict past-downward temporal self-comparison, F(3, 332) = 10.21, p < .
001, RSQ = .08; β0 = 5.35; βPOS = .29, β*POS = .22, t(332) = 3.73, p < .001; βFSC = .06, 
β*FSC = .06, t(332) = 1.75, p = .30; βFSC*POS = -.13, β*FSC*POS = -.12, t(332) = -2.09, p = .
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04, such that as one aspect of future self-connectedness increased, the relation of the 
other to past-downward temporal self-comparison became weaker. At low levels (-1 SD) 
of similarity-connectedness, the relation between positivity and past-downward temporal 
self-comparison was stronger and significant, β0 = 5.28; βPOS = .44, β*POS = .331, t(332) = 
4.90, p < .001, whereas this relation was weaker and nonsignificant at high levels (+1 
SD) of similarity-connectedness, β0 = 5.42; βPOS = .14, β*POS = .11, t(332) = 1.17, p = .24 
(see Figure 7). Similarly, at low levels of positivity, the relation between similarity-
connectedness and past-downward temporal self-comparison was stronger and 
significant, β0 = 5.10; βFSC = .17, β*FSC = .16, t(332) = 2.00, p = .05, whereas this relation 
was weaker and nonsignificant at high levels of positivity, β0 = 5.60; βFSC = -.05, β*FSC = 
-.05, t(332) = -.67, p = .51 (see Figure 8). This interaction exhibited a similar pattern as 
the interaction between vividness and similarity-connectedness. 
 Interactions in the SEM. When the positivity*similarity-connectedness and 
vividness*similarity-connectedness interaction terms were added to the primary SEM, 
however, the interaction effects on self-affirming temporal self-comparison were 
nonsignificant for both positivity*similarity, ɣ = -.06, ɣ* = -.07, p = .26, and 
vividness*similarity, ɣ = -.006, ɣ* = .01, p = .83. The model with these interaction terms 
did not differ in terms of fit from the primary model, 𝜒2(54) = 132, p < .001, RMSEA = .
044, CFI = .948, SRMR = .038, ∆𝜒2(18) = 18.52, ∆𝜒2 p = .42.  
Study 1 Discussion  
  !39
 Study 1 provided consistent support for my first two hypotheses: (1) future self-
connectedness predicted social comparison and temporal self-comparison, and (2) future 
self-connectedness predicted later emotion regulation, academic motivation, and 
psychological adjustment. Overall, as expected, greater connectedness predicted less 
social comparison, less self-deflating (i.e., past-upward and future-downward) temporal 
self-comparison, more self-affirming (i.e., past-downward and future-upward) temporal 
self-comparison, better emotion regulation, greater academic motivation, and higher well-
being. 
 The three components of future self-connectedness differed in how they related to 
the three outcomes of interest. It is best to keep in mind that the zero order correlations 
between the individual components and the individual indicators of these three outcomes 
were almost all significant. That is, the nonsignificance of the paths in the model is most 
likely due to a portion the variance predicting the outcomes being shared by the 
components of future self-connectedness. Similarity-connectedness directly predicted 
academic motivation, emotion regulation and adjustment. Positivity directly predicted 
adjustment and emotion regulation and also had positive indirect effects emotion 
regulation via self-affirming temporal self-comparison, on academic motivation via both 
self-affirming and self-deflating temporal self-comparison, and adjustment via self-
deflating temporal self-comparison. Vividness had a positive indirect effect on academic 
motivation via self-affirming temporal self-comparison. Overall, all measures of future 
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self-connectedness predicted the three outcomes of interest as expected, but the processes 
differed somewhat from one another.  
 The exploratory analyses revealed some interesting findings. First, I tested 
whether the individual components of future self-connectedness interacted with each 
other to affect comparison and the outcomes of interest. Overall and across many 
analyses, they did not interact. There were only two such instances when the components 
of future self-connectedness interacted, and these interactions did not hold when added to 
the SEM. In light of this, we should conclude that the different components are somewhat 
redundant in their relations to comparison processes and the outcomes of interest, given 
that these relations were significant as bivariate correlations but some were 
nonsignificant in the SEM, but generally do not interact to affect these processes.  
 The two interactions that did emerge, however, may still be meaningful. Past-
downward temporal self-comparison, the type of self-enhancing temporal self-
comparison given the greatest focus by temporal self-appraisal researchers (e.g., Wilson 
& Ross, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001; Ross & Wilson, 2002; Ross & Wilson, 2003), was 
predicted but the interaction of positivity and similarity-connectedness and by the 
interaction of vividness and similarity-connectedness. When participants were low in 
vividness or low in positivity, similarity-connectedness was more strongly associated 
with this self-enhancing type of temporal self-comparison. That is, low-positivity high-
connectedness individuals were engaging more in a self-affirming type of temporal self-
comparison involving the past self. In a sense, similarity-connectedness may have helped 
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participants who were low in positivity (or vividness) about their future self employ a 
strategy that would affirm the current self without drawing focus to the future self. 
Individuals lower in positivity about their future self may avoid focusing on that future 
self, and individuals lower in future self-vividness may get less of a boon thinking about 
a future self that is hard to see, making past-downward temporal self-comparison a more 
viable means of self-enhancement. Another interpretation of these findings could be that 
one does not need all three components of connectedness, just one. Those who were high 
in positivity or vividness or similarity-connectedness were all showing greater past-
downward temporal self-comparison, and those who were high in two components 
showed similar engagement in this self-affirming type of temporal self-comparison as 
those who were high in just one component. Still, this interactive effect was not observed 
for any of the other criteria, and these analyses were exploratory, so these findings should 
be interpreted with caution.  
 Second, I examined whether there were differences between the similarity and 
connectedness in predicting comparison, adjustment, emotion regulation, and motivation. 
Though these two items have been averaged into a single measure in past research (e.g., 
Bryan & Hershfield, 2013; Adelman et al., 2017), they may be both conceptually and 
psychologically distinct constructs. Constraining single-item similarity and 
connectedness to be equal did not worsen model fit, which suggests that they were not 
having independent predictive power in the model. This finding alleviates concerns about 
combining the two items into a single measure and implies that these two constructs – 
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similarity to the future self and connectedness to the future self – closely resemble each 
other in terms of how people think about them.  
 Third, I tested whether similarity and connectedness were functioning in this 
model the same for first-generation and continuing-generation college students, given 
that they may have different meaning or connotations for these two groups. Several paths 
in the model differed for these two groups. The relation between similarity and 
connectedness, the path from connectedness to emotion regulation, and the paths from 
both types of temporal self-comparison to psychological adjustment were stronger for 
first-generation students, whereas the relation between connectedness and social 
comparison was stronger for continuing-generation students. Given the lack of a 
consistent pattern – for instance, connectedness was not simply a better predictor for first-
generation college students – future research should seek to replicate and verify these 
findings. The most important finding here may be that temporal self-comparison seems to 
play a bigger role in well-being for first-generation college students. This may have 
implications for developing strategies to both bolster and avoid harming first-generation 
college students’ well-being. 
Study 2 
 Building on Study 1, which found that future self-connectedness predicted 
comparison processes and had positive downstream effects, Study 2 tests the hypothesis 
that experimentally increasing future self-connectedness has similar effects on 
comparison processes and on outcomes related to emotion, intrapsychic adjustment, and 
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motivation. First, I consider the existing future self-connectedness manipulations, their 
efficacy, and their issues. Despite the effectiveness of these manipulations in terms of 
affecting future self-connectedness and decision-making, there may be reasonable cause 
for the development of new, easy-to-implement, scalable future self-connectedness 
manipulations. I draw on the existing future self-connectedness manipulations as I 
develop a new pilot future self-connectedness manipulation to implement in Study 2.  
Previous Future Self-Connectedness Manipulations 
 Vividness. In research that has manipulated the vividness of the future self, these 
experiments typically induce vividness by showing participants older, computer-aged 
versions of themselves or a control (e.g., a picture of their current self). In one typical 
study from this literature, participants wear a headset that puts them in an immersive 
virtual reality environment which allows them to see their older selves when looking at a 
virtual mirror  (Hershfield et al., 2011). Compared to a control group, these participants 
exhibit less-myopic discounting temporal tendencies and invest more in a retirement 
spending task. Such future self-vividness manipulations have been employed as 
interventions intended to reduce adolescent delinquency. One such study utilizes the same 
immersive virtual reality procedure as described above, gives participants an opportunity 
to cheat that would earn them €7, and finds that participants who have seen their older 
self are less likely to cheat relative to participants in the control condition (van Gelder et 
al., 2013). Another study implements an intervention that embeds static computed aged-
images in a Facebook page for each participant’s future self, tracks self-reported 
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delinquency, and finds that participants linked to their future selves report less 
delinquency relative to participants in a control condition (Van Gelder et al., 2015). The 
main issue with these types of experimental manipulations is that they are time/labor 
intensive and most likely not easy to scale up to a larger sample.  
 Similarity. Several studies have developed experimental manipulations to 
increase perceptions of similarity to the future self, and most of these manipulations do so 
by highlighting the stability of the person over time. One study gave participants, high 
school seniors near graduation, information claiming that a person’s core identity and the 
characteristics that make up a person either stay relatively stable and are already fixed for 
people their age (high similarity) or are likely to fluctuate and change radically around 
graduation and during college (low similarity). Participants in the high similarity 
condition made more patient intertemporal decisions on a later task (Bartels & Urminsky, 
2011). Subsequent studies have replicated this finding using a young adult population and 
modifying the manipulation to be more general (i.e., removing references to graduation). 
This manipulation has also been found to increase measures of future self-similarity 
(Sheldon & Fishbach, 2015). Although this manipulation is brief, effective, and easy to 
implement, it may be harmful in certain domains outside of financial decision-making 
(e.g., performance, motivation). In a preliminary study, this manipulation promoted a 
more entity theory of intelligence relative to control (Pilot Study; IES, 2016). This is 
noteworthy because of the well-documented benefits to academic motivation and 
performance of having a more incremental theory of intelligence, suggesting that this 
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manipulation could have unintended harmful effects on academic motivation and 
performance. 
 Other studies have manipulated perceptions of similarity to the future self through 
experiences of cognitive accessibility; participants judged how easily they could generate 
two reasons (high-similarity) or 10 reasons (low-similarity) why their personal identity 
would remain highly stable over the next year, and participants in the high-similarity 
condition exhibited less-myopic temporal discounting behaviors (Bartels & Urminsky, 
2011). One study employed both the identity-stability manipulation and the cognitive-
accessibility manipulation in a 2 x 2 design, and participants who were in the high 
stability/high similarity condition scored higher on a future self-continuity measure and 
were less likely to advocate inappropriate negotiation strategies (Hershfield et al., 2012). 
Finally, another study found that a personal power manipulation increased future self-
similarity, led to less-myopic temporal discounting, and that the effect on discounting was 
mediated by future self-similarity (Joshi & Fast, 2013).  
 Positivity. Research examining the positivity component of future self-
connectedness has used attitudes toward the elderly as a proxy for holding a positive 
attitude toward the future self, and the experimental manipulations of positivity have 
utilized a similar approach (Hershfield & Galinsky, 2011 as reported in Hershfield, 2011). 
A series of studies found that when participants took the perspective of an elderly person, 
remembered a time they respected an elderly person, or were primed with words related 
to the elderly and respect, they placed greater value on the future, as evidenced by 
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decisions on discounting and saving tasks. Though these effects mirror the effects of 
future self-connectedness and future self-connectedness manipulations, it is unclear the 
psychological processes at work, whether these manipulations are increasing positivity of 
the future self or directly affecting temporal valuation.  
Study 2 Method 
Design 
 Study 2 tested the hypothesis that increasing future self-connectedness has 
corresponding effects on social comparison, temporal self-comparison, intrapsychic 
adjustment, emotion, and motivation. To do so, I implemented a randomized experiment 
with three conditions: (1) a no-manipulation control condition, (2) the established 
identity-stability future self-connectedness manipulation, and (3) a pilot future self-
connectedness manipulation developed for this study based on connectedness 
manipulations developed for a different research project. This study aimed to establish 
whether future self-connectedness had a causal relation to comparison processes, 
adjustment, emotion, and motivation.  
 New pilot future self-connectedness manipulation. This future self-
connectedness manipulation attempted to increase all three components of connectedness 
together. It consisted of two parts, the first of which attempted to enhance vividness and 
connectedness and the second of which targeted positivity and connectedness. In the first 
part, participants read the following passage and then drafted a written response: "Take a 
moment and imagine yourself ten years from now. Build an image in your mind’s eye and 
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visualize your current self becoming your future self. How will the person you are now 
shape the person you will be in ten years?" The second part of the manipulation 
continued to build positivity and connectedness with the following prompt: "Continue 
thinking about your future self. What will you be doing in the future? Consider how you 
could make a significant, meaningful difference in your life, in the lives of your family 
members, and in the wider world. What are you doing now that will help you achieve 
those goals and become that future self?" Again, participants in this condition drafted a 
written response after the prompt. 
 There were several new and noteworthy aspects of this pilot future self-
connectedness manipulation. First, it attempted to affect all three components of future 
self-connectedness, unlike previous future self-connectedness manipulations6, which only 
attempt to affect one component at a time. Second, the order in which this manipulation 
targeted each component was designed to maximize its effect. There may be something 
about creating a vivid image of your future self and then imbuing it with positivity, all the 
while connecting that future self to who you are now, which could deliver an especially 
effective boost of future self-connectedness. Third, this manipulation refined 
connectedness manipulations we had previously piloted while also remaining brief, easy 
to implement, and scalable to large samples, unlike prior labor-intensive future self-
connectedness manipulations. It represented a synthesis of a guided visualization 
procedure pilot tested in the PSY 101 questionnaire, which increased connectedness 
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(single item), and connectedness-based interventions developed for the IES project, 
which also increased various future self-connectedness measures (IES, 2016).  
 Identity-stability manipulation. Study 2 included an established future self-
connectedness manipulation, which has been shown to increase future self-connectedness 
(single item) and decrease discounting. This provided a point of comparison for the pilot 
connectedness manipulation and allowed a test of whether the pilot manipulation 
performed better than an existing one. Participants read the following paragraph and then 
wrote a brief summary (adapted from Bartels & Urminsky, 2011): Day-to-day life events 
change appreciably after high school graduation as students transition to college life, but 
what changes the least between graduation and life after high school is the person’s core 
identity. The characteristics that make you the person you are… are established early in 
life and fixed by the end of adolescence. Several studies conducted with young adults 
before and after high school graduation have shown that the traits that make your 
personal identity remain remarkably stable.  
Participants 
 This study was offered as an extra credit opportunity in an undergraduate 
introductory psychology course, and the final sample consisted of 443 participants, 
though 24 participants did not complete the entire study and did not provide demographic 
information (the percentages reported here include those 24 participants). Of the 443 
participants, 147 (33.2%) were in the control condition, 141 (31.8%) received the pilot 
future self-connectedness manipulation, and 148 (33.4%) received B&U manipulation. 
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The breakdown in terms of subjective socioeconomic class was 33 working class (7.4%), 
41 lower middle class (9.3%), 161 middle class (36.3%), 157 upper middle class (35.4%), 
and 27 upper class (6.1%). The sample contained 136 (30.7%) first-generation college 
students and 282 (63.7%) continuing-generation college students. The breakdown in 
terms of ethnicity was 216 (48.8%) White/Caucasian/European American, 43 (9.7%) East 
Asian/Asian American/Southeast Asian/Pacific Islander, 69 (15.6%) Hispanic/Latino(a)/
Chicano(a)/Latin American, 27 (6.1%) South Asian/Indian, 15 (3.4%) Middle Eastern/
Arab/Arab American, 4 (.9%) Native American/Alaska Native, 23 (5.2%) Black/African 
American/African/West Indian, 20 (4.5%) participants who identified as “other,” and two 
participants who did not provide this information. In terms of sex, 210 (47.4%) 
participants were female, and 209 (47.2%) participants were male. The sample contained 
292 (66%) first-year students, 82 (18.5%) second-year students, 30 (6.8%) third-year 
students, nine fourth-year students (2.0%), one fifth-year student (.2%), and five students 
(1.1%) who indicted “other.” 
Measures 
 To address the causal relation of future self-connectedness with social comparison 
and temporal self-comparison, Study 2 included the same measures of future self-
connectedness, social comparison, and temporal self-comparison as in Study 1 directly 
following the experimental condition. In addition, Study 2 included measures of emotion 
regulation (Gross & John, 2003), well-being (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; 
Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; Robins, Hendin, 
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Trzesniewski, 2001), mood (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to test the hypotheses 
concerning the relation of future self-connectedness with affect and intrapsychic 
adjustment. These were the same measures of emotion regulation, well-being, and self-
esteem used in Study 1.  
 Given the established link between social comparison and mood in the literature 
(Collins, 1996), Study 2 assessed mood via the PANAS (positive and negative affect 
schedule), a 20-item measure of positive and negative affect. Participants report how 
much they are experiencing various feelings or emotions from on a 1 (very slightly or not 
at all) to 5 (extremely). The negative affect items included distressed, upset, ashamed, 
guilty, scared, hostile, nervous, afraid, irritable, disgusted, threatened, helpless, angry, 
and aggressive. The positive affect items include alert, excited, inspired, strong, 
determined, attentive, enthusiastic, proud, active, and in control. 
Prospective Power Analysis 
 I assumed a small-to-medium effect size for effects of the future self-
connectedness manipulations. To achieve .80 power with f = .18 and three groups, it 
would require a total sample size of 303 (i.e., 101 participants per each of the three 
conditions).  
Data Cleaning 
 There were several steps of data cleaning to ensure that the final sample consisted 
of participants who were paying attention and processed whichever manipulation they 
received. The raw data file provided 488 cases, but there were many instances of 
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participants completing the study more than once. In the case of repeaters, if both cases 
provided complete data, the first completion of the study was kept. Otherwise, the most 
complete response was kept. Once repeaters were processed, the working data file 
contained 443 cases, though 24 participants did not complete the entire study. The study 
included a manipulation check question, which asked participants about which condition 
they were in at the beginning of the study. The 40 participants who failed this 
manipulation check were not included in the final sample. There were also an attention 
check question which prompted participants to response "agree" if they were paying 
attention. The 30 participants who failed the attention check were not included in the final 
sample. Fifty-five participants failed either of these two checks. I conducted data analysis 
with the entire working sample of 443 cases and then again with the sample of 388 
participants who passed both the attention check and manipulation check.  
 In the control condition, 14 failed the manipulation check, five failed the attention 
check, and 17 failed either check. In the connectedness condition, nine failed the 
manipulation check, seven failed the attention check, and 13 failed either check. In the 
identity-stability condition, 10 failed the manipulation check, 11 failed the attention 
check, and 18 failed either. The cleaned sample contained 130 in the control condition, 
128 in the connectedness condition, and 130 in the identity-stability condition, which was 
sufficient to test the effect of experimental condition given the prospective power 
analysis. 
Study 2 Results 
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Manipulation Check 
 I first examined whether the experimental manipulations affected future self-
connectedness (see Table 9). Unfortunately, omnibus ANOVA tests did not find effects of 
experimental condition on the primary measures of future self-connectedness, including 
the similarity-connectedness aggregate, F(2, 425) = .307, p = .74; the vividness 
aggregate, F(2, 425) = .807, p = .45; and the positivity aggregate, F(2, 423) = 526, p = .
59. These findings held when I examined the individual items which composed the 
aggregate measures (see Table 9), Fs < 1.54, ps > .23. I tested each manipulation 
condition relative to control as independent-samples t-tests, which yielded the same null 
effects.  
 I conducted these same analyses again only including those participants who 
passed both the manipulation check and the attention check. This yielded similar findings 
of no significant effects of the manipulations. I also conducted these analyses with only 
first-year students; again, this yielded similar findings of no effects of experimental 
condition.  
 Because the experimental manipulations failed the manipulation check (i.e., did 
not affect future self-connectedness), it limits the interpretation of this study. That is, this 
study should probably not be viewed as testing the effect of increasing future self-
connectedness on social comparison and temporal self-comparison if the manipulations 
were not able to successfully increase connectedness.  
Experimental Effects on Comparison Processes 
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 A series of one-way ANOVAs tested whether experimental condition affected 
social comparison or temporal self-comparison (see Table 10). There was no effect of 
condition on social comparison with peers, F(2, 426) = 1.67, p = .19, self-affirming 
temporal self-comparison, F(2, 426) = .23, p = .78, or self-deflating temporal self-
comparison, F(2,426) = 2.50, p = .08. In addition to testing the effect of condition on the 
composite measures of temporal self-comparison and social comparison with peers, I 
tested the effect of condition on the individual comparison subscales. Experimental 
condition did not effect the individual subscales of upward, downward, or direction-
unspecified social comparison (see Table 10). These null findings held when the sample 
was filtered to only those participants who passed the attention and manipulation checks. 
Experimental Effects on Emotion, Well-Being, Motivation  
 As Study 1 found downstream effects of connectedness on emotion, well-being, 
and motivation, Study 2 tested whether experimental condition affected any of these 
outcomes of interest (see Table 10). Condition did not affect emotion regulation, F(2, 
421) = .40, p = .67. In terms of well-being, condition did not affect satisfaction with life, 
F(2, 423) = .36, p = .70; single-item self-esteem, F(2, 421) = .18, p = .83; or scores on the 
Rosenberg self-esteem measure, F(2, 420) = .92, p = .40. In terms of academic 
motivation, experimental condition had no effect on academic self, efficacy, F(2, 414) = 
1.54, p = .22; academic valuing, F(2, 420) = .35, p = .71; academic disengagement, F(2, 
420) = .85; self-rated likelihood of graduating from college, F(2, 420) = .39, p = .68; or 
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expected GPA, F(2, 420) = 2.89, p = .06. This pattern of null results was replicated when 
analyses were conducted with the cleaned sample.  
Experimental Effects on Mood 
 Finally, I examined the effect of experimental condition on mood using the 
PANAS (see Table 11). Condition did not affect the positive affect aggregate, F(2, 414) 
= .33, p = .72, or the negative affect aggregate, F(2, 414) = .15, p = .86. The only 
individual item of the PANAS which experimental condition affected was the helpless 
item (see Table 12), F(2, 414) = 4.18, p = .02, Mcontrol = 1.96 (SD = 1.28), Mconnectedness = 
1.58 (SD = .98), Midentitystability = 1.88 (SD = 1.13). This measure failed the homogeneity of 
variances test, F(2, 414) = 5.49, p = .004. Contrast tests indicated significant or 
marginally significant differences between the following pairings: control vs. 
manipulations, t(230.95) = -1.83, p = .069; control vs. identity-stability, t(257.52) = -2.73, 
p = .007; connectedness vs. identity-stability, t(275.47) = 2.36, p = .02; connectedness vs. 
control and identity-stability, t(311.42) = -3.03, p = .003. This analyses indicated that the 
connectedness manipulation decreased feelings of helplessness. These findings held when 
analyses were conducted with the cleaned sample.  
Examination of Pre-Manipulation Measures 
 Because the sample consisted of PSY 101 students, I was able to merge a subset 
of the Study 2 sample with students’ responses on the PSY 101 questionnaire; 75 
participants provided responses on both the PSY 101 questionnaire and the Study 2 
survey, ncontrol = 25, nconnectedness = 22-24, nidentitystability = 28. Though the sample size per 
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condition was quite small, this allowed for a cursory examination of the means and, albeit 
underpowered, tests of pre- post-manipulation effects on the future self-connectedness 
measures.  
 A series of 2x3 (pre-post x condition) mixed model ANOVAs tested the effects of 
experimental condition by pre- post- manipulation on the three aggregate connectedness 
measures and the seven individual items (see Table 13): similarity-connectedness 
aggregate, F(2, 72) = .44, p = .65; positivity aggregate, F(2, 72) = .70, p = .50; vividness 
aggregate, F(2, 72) = 2.51, p = .09; future self-similarity, F(2, 72) = .15, p = .86; single-
item future self-connectedness, F(2, 72) = .73, p = .48; future self-liking, F(2, 72) = 1.54, 
p = .22; 100-point positivity item, F(2, 72) = .94, p = .40; 7-point positivity item, F(2, 72) 
= .64, p = .53; vividness, F(2, 72) = 1.44, p = .24; and ease of mental imagery, F(2, 72) = 
3.12, p = .051. There were no significant effects. Similar ANCOVA analyses, testing the 
effect of condition on each of the post-manipulation connectedness measures while 
controlling for its pre-manipulation counterpart, also revealed no significant effects of 
condition.  
 Importantly, an examination of the pre-manipulation means suggests that there 
may have been baseline differences in connectedness among the experimental conditions 
(see Table 14). Because of the small sample size (22-28 per condition, varying slightly by 
measure), I examined the effect size differences among the conditions on the pre-
manipulation future self-connectedness measures. Of the possible pairwise comparisons, 
17 out of 30 reflected mean differences of d = .2 or greater. For instance, participants in 
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the control condition were d = .48 higher on single-item vividness than participants in the 
identity-stability condition and d = .21 higher than those in the pilot manipulation 
condition. One reason for the ineffectiveness of the manipulations may have been that 
participants in the control condition were already higher in aspects of connectedness 
before the manipulations. Given the small sample size, testing these differences would be 
underpowered, but these differences may account, at least in part, for the null effects of 
the experimental manipulations on connectedness.  
Brief Discussion  
 Study 2 did not provide support for the hypothesis of a causal link between future 
self-connectedness and comparison processes (Hypothesis 3). Given that the primary 
manipulation check for this study failed – the manipulations did not affect future self-
connectedness – this study did not constitute a valid test of the causal relation between 
future self-connectedness and comparison processes. Similarly, there were no 
conventionally significant effects of the manipulations on comparison processes, 
academic motivation, emotion regulation, or psychological adjustment. Random baseline 
differences could have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the manipulations, there may 
have been some aspects of the manipulations which were themselves actually ineffective 
at affecting future self-connectedness, or perhaps the filler task nullified any effects of the 
manipulations. Future research should utilize other designs in order to test the causal 
relation between future self-connectedness and comparison processes.  
General Discussion  
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 This investigation tested how future self-connectedness relates to comparison 
processes (both social comparison with others and temporal self-comparison), emotion, 
psychological adjustment, and motivation. In addition, this research attempted to examine 
the causal relation between connectedness and comparison processes and outcomes. First, 
I expected that future self-connectedness would predict more self-affirming types of 
temporal self-comparison (i.e., comparisons with past or future selves which reflect well 
on the current self, such as comparisons with worse past selves or better future selves), 
less social comparison with others and less self-deflating temporal self comparison (i.e., 
comparisons with past or future selves which reflect poorly on the self, such as 
comparisons with better past selves or worse future selves). Second, I hypothesized future 
self-connectedness would predict better emotion regulation, better psychological 
adjustment, and greater motivation, and that connectedness would affect these outcomes 
via comparison processes. Third, I predicted a causal relation between future self-
connectedness and comparison processes.  
 Overall, this investigation found support for the first two hypotheses but not for 
the third hypothesis. As expected, future self-connectedness predicted more past-
downward and future-upward temporal self-comparison (both types of self-affirming 
temporal self-comparison), less past-upward and future-downward temporal self-
comparison (both types of self-deflating temporal self-comparison), and less social 
comparison. These relations were more pronounced among the positivity and vividness 
components and less so for the similarity-connectedness component. It makes sense that 
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the positivity component would show more robust relations to such types of temporal 
self-comparison given its very nature; holding a positive view of the future self may 
reflect a generally positive self-concept, which would lead to temporal self-comparisons 
that function to preserve this positive self-image. Also as expected, future self-
connectedness predicted emotion regulation, psychological adjustment, and academic 
motivation. The similarity-connectedness component directly predicted these outcomes, 
whereas future self-vividness and future self-positivity had indirect effects on these 
outcomes via temporal self-comparison processes, though positivity also had direct 
positive effects on psychological adjustment and emotion regulation. Contrary to 
expectations, the experimental manipulations intended to increase future self-
connectedness and have corresponding effects on comparison processes did not succeed 
in increasing future self-connectedness. This limits the ability to make inferences about 
the causal nature between connectedness and comparison processes.  
Importance and Contributions 
 Novel psychological processes and outcomes. This research builds on the future 
self-connectedness literature by linking connectedness to social comparison and temporal 
self-comparison, psychological processes which have not been previously considered in 
this literature. It is the first research, to my knowledge at least, demonstrating that 
perceptions of the future self influence how individuals compare themselves to other 
people and to their past and future selves. This represents a significant departure from the 
mechanisms this literature has primarily focused on, such as temporal discounting, 
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temporal attention, and self-control. In this longitudinal research, future self-
connectedness predicted comparison tendencies assessed 28 weeks later, suggesting the 
enduring nature of this relation. 
 In addition, this investigation linked future self-connectedness to a new set of 
important outcomes, particularly to emotion regulation, psychological adjustment, and 
academic motivation. Prior research on future self-connectedness has primary focused on 
its relation to time preference, financial decision-making, ethical decision-making, 
delinquency, and academic performance. These findings extend the importance of future 
self-connectedness beyond decision-making to psychological well-being and emotion 
regulation. Importantly, the longitudinal nature of this research demonstrates that future 
self-connectedness predicts these outcomes related to emotion and adjustment a year later 
 Why promote future self-connectedness? It may be possible to leverage 
findings from the literature on future self-connectedness, including this investigation, in 
order to do social good through the development of brief, evidence-based interventions. 
In addition to the empirical findings demonstrating future self-connectedness can be 
increased via experimental paradigms with corresponding effects on intertemporal 
decision-making (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Hershfield et al., 2011; Hershfield, 
2011; Hershfield et al., 2012; van Gelder et al., 2013; Joshi & Fast, 2013; Sheldon & 
Fishbach, 2015; Bartels & Urminsky, 2015), an intervention based on the future self-
connectedness literature reduced adolescent delinquency (van Gelder et al., 2015). Our 
research team is currently developing a future self connectedness-based intervention 
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intended to increase retention and performance in academic settings (IES, 2016). These 
types of interventions may have to potential to also enhance motivation, well-being, and 
emotion regulation. Connectedness to the future self may also have clinical implications 
through its relation to temporal self-comparison and psychological adjustment. That is, 
clinical populations may be more likely to make self-deflating types of temporal self-
comparison, promoting depressive symptoms, and enhancing connectedness may 
attenuate that harmful cycle.  
 Contributions to other literatures. This research also represents a contribution 
to the social comparison and temporal self-comparison literatures. The measure 
developed for this research provides a more sensitive, nuanced assessment of social and 
temporal self-comparison tendencies than other measures and methods used in the 
literature (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Wilson & Ross, 2000). This research also 
suggests that self-deflating types of temporal self-comparison may be more common than 
prior research has implied (cf., Wilson & Ross, 2000). This may be in part because past 
research has employed a trait-listing methodology or has asked participants about 
temporal self-comparisons in a particular domain, such as social skills. The prevalence, 
frequency, and impact of temporal self-comparisons may be domain specific, an issue 
which future research should seek to clarify.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Ineffective manipulations. The most problematic limitation of this research was 
the ineffectiveness of the experimental manipulations in Study 2. The ineffectiveness of 
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the experimental manipulations was made all the more unusual given that the identity-
stability manipulation has been used in several published studies, which found effects on 
measures of connectedness (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Bartels, Kvaran, & Nichols, 
2013; Bartels & Urminsky, 2015). In addition, research using manipulations similar to the 
pilot future self-connectedness manipulation also found those manipulations increased 
measures of future self-connectedness (IES, 2016). 
 Why did the manipulations not work? One plausible reason for why the pilot 
manipulation did not have its intended effect concerns aspects of the manipulation itself. 
Unlike other manipulations of connectedness, the pilot future self-connectedness 
manipulation attempted to target all three components of connectedness; instead of being 
a positive, this may have had the unintended effect of rendering the manipulation less 
effective. This design of the manipulation – creating a vivid image of the future self, 
connecting it to the current self, thinking about positive aspects of the future self, and 
connecting it back to the current self again – may have spread participants’ attention and 
effort across the three components of connectedness and made it more difficult for them 
to complete each part. Instead of focusing on all three components resulted in reinforcing 
each other, it may have detracted from all of them. The manipulations this pilot 
manipulation is based on were much longer, and participants completed multiple tasks in 
order, for example, to increase the vividness of their future self (e.g., writing about their 
future self, selecting photos to represent their future self, reading about a possible role 
model, more writing about their future self). Spreading out the manipulation in that way 
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may have been more effective because it allowed participants more time to put together 
thoughts about their future in a way that was easy to recall and describe. If participants 
found it difficult to create this imagery or think of such positive things, the manipulation 
could have even backfired in some instances and decreased future self-connectedness 
(Schwarz et al., 1991). 
 Additionally, Study 2 took place in the spring semester, whereas previous the 
manipulations this pilot was based on took place during the fall semester. It may be the 
case that college students’ future self-connectedness is more malleable right at the 
beginning of college. as opposed to a semester later after they have had time to form their 
future self-concept. This could account for why both manipulations did not have effects 
on connectedness.  
 Another plausible explanation for the null results is “unhappy randomization.” An 
examination of a subset of the sample who reported their future self-connectedness on the 
PSY 101 Questionnaire, which was administered roughly four weeks before Study 2, 
suggests that these null findings may be due, in part, to random differences in pre-
existing levels of future self-connectedness across the three conditions. These baseline 
differences may have diluted or nullified the effects of both the manipulations. As 
described in Table 14, over half of the possible pairwise differences among the means of 
the different experimental conditions on the future self-connectedness measures are on 
the magnitude of small to medium effects. 
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 In addition, there may have been something different about the study design 
which could account for the ineffectiveness of the manipulations. Study 2 included a 
filler task, which was not used in other research. It may be possible that the filler task 
drew attention away from the thoughts and mental imagery created by the experimental 
manipulations, perhaps enough to dilute the effects. This filler task consisted of making 
subjective judgments about pairs of similar photographs taken by the author. Two pairs of 
the photos were of brightly colored flowers, red and yellow, and two pairs of photos were 
of animals, a bear and a goose. There may have been something about these vivid, 
striking visual stimuli which drew participants into the moment and diverted their 
attention away from thoughts and imagery of the future self. Similarly, the subjective 
preference judgments required some amount of attention to compare the two photos in 
each pair. It may have been more effort and attention than intended, and possibly enough 
to detract from the manipulations.  
 Inattentiveness or lack of engagement does not seem to be a viable explanation 
for why the manipulations did not have the predicted effects. These null effects held 
when restricting the sample to only those who passed the manipulation check. In a 
follow-up analysis, participants who spent less than a minute on any page of the 
manipulations were filtered out; the null effects remained null.  
 Alternative design. If there issues were responsible for the ineffectiveness of the 
experimental manipulations, an alternative study design could address or control for some 
of these issues. First, the experimental manipulations would be changed. Instead of 
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attempting to manipulate all there components of future self-connectedness at once, there 
would be separate conditions for similarity-connectedness, vividness, and positivity. The 
pilot manipulation may have been ineffective because it tried to do too much in too short 
of a span of time, so these manipulations would be longer, less intense, and participants 
would be prompted to think about their future selves with related tasks before doing any 
writing about their future selves. For instance, the vividness manipulation could include a 
section where participants select photos to represent their future self and future life, a 
couple multiple-choice questions about participants’ futures, and then a writing section 
similar to the first part of the pilot manipulation in Study 2, without the connectedness 
part.  
 Second, a full pre- post- study design would allow for a full examination of 
baseline scores before the manipulation and whether there were pre-existing differences 
among the groups before implementation of the manipulations. Third, counterbalancing 
the measures of interest (comparison, well-being, motivation, emotion) with the future 
self-connectedness measures would rule out the possibility that the manipulation check 
measures themselves were diluting the effects of the manipulation. Fourth, the filler task 
would be removed. Fifth, another major limitation of this research was that it did not 
manipulate social comparison or temporal self-comparison. Pilot manipulations that 
would attempt to increase self-affirming temporal self-comparison, upward social 
comparison, and downward social comparison would also be added. Because of potential 
harmful effects, a self-deflating temporal self-comparison manipulation would not be 
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included. Taken together, these design changes could rectify the issues with Study 2 and 
allow for a true test of the causal relation between future self-connectedness and 
comparison processes.  
Coda 
 This investigation found preliminary evidence for a link between psychological 
connectedness to the future self and how individuals compare themselves to their past 
and future selves and to others. As expected, individuals who were greater in 
connectedness to the future self showed a greater tendency to make self-enhancing 
comparisons with their past and future selves, less of a tendency to compare themselves 
to their past and future selves in a way that reflected poorly on themselves, and less of a 
tendency to compare themselves to other people. Further, greater connectedness predicted 
higher well-being a year later, better emotion regulation a year later, and greater academic 
motivation 28 weeks later. This research, however, does not adequately address the causal 
relation between future self-connectedness and temporal self-comparison or social 
comparison, nor does it rule out alternative processes models (e.g., self-efficacy and 
emotion regulation affecting comparison processes and future self-connectedness). Future 
research should seek to clarify these issues. Still, this research extends the literature on 
future self-connectedness to new psychological processes – social comparison and 
temporal self-comparison – and to important, new outcomes – emotion regulation and 
psychological adjustment. As such, this research contributes to the existing literature and 
shows promise for future investigation.  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Footnotes 
1 The original guided visualization procedure gave participants the following: Think 
of who you are today. Focus on your good qualities, your best qualities — project 
them and who you are into the future. Imagine yourself a week from now. You are 
the best you can be. Imagine yourself a month from now. You are the best you can 
be. Imagine yourself a year from now. You are the best you can be. Now take a 
moment. Take a moment with your future self.  In your mind’s eye, sit next to the 
you ten years from now.  See who you become, and who you have always been. 
Feel that person emerging inside you. Visualize yourself ten years from now – 
hold that image and let it grow organically. Use the space below to write about 
your future self. 
2 In the pilot test of the IES manipulation, participants created a social media 
profile for their future self, which included them writing a blurb about their self in 
10 years, selecting photos to depict their future life, writing about how they will 
make a meaningful difference in the future, reading a letter from a potential role 
model, and writing a letter of advice to their current self from their future self. 
Relative to a no-manipulation control condition, this manipulation increased 
future self-connectedness (single item), and positivity, and also led to a marginally 
signifiant increase in future self-esteem and vividness in its pilot testing. This 
version of this intervention included four pre- and post- measures for participants 
in the experimental condition, and all four measures – future self-connectedness, 
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future self-similarity, future self-esteem, and ease of picturing the future – showed 
increases after the manipulation. A pared-down version of the pilot, which 
removed two of the three writing prompts (the “meaningful difference” and “letter 
of advice” prompts), increased positivity of the future self, future self-esteem, and 
future vividness. 
3 To verify the superiority of the three-indicator academic motivation latent variable 
over the five-indicator academic motivation latent variable, I took the primary 
model and substituted the five-indicator latent variable. That is, I tested a model 
similar to the SEM from Figure 3, except it used five indicators for the academic 
motivation latent variable. This model showed worse fit with these data than 
when the original three-indicator version of the academic motivation latent 
variable was used, 𝜒2(69) = 362.59, p < .001, RMSEA = .062, CFI = .851, SRMR 
= .086, ∆𝜒2(37) = 256.65, ∆𝜒2 p < .001. 
4 I also examined SEMs with one-factor versions of future self-connectedness, 
which modified the primary models by substituting the three factors of 
connectedness with one single future self-connectedness variable. I tested two 
one-factor future self-connectedness models. When future self-connectedness was 
treated as a latent variable – the six items were its indicators – the model showed 
poor fit, 𝜒2(109) = 375.44, p < .001, RMSEA = .066, CFI = .886, SRMR = .086. 
When future self-connectedness was treated as an observed variable – the six 
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items were standardized and averaged – the model showed acceptable fit, 𝜒2(28) = 
70.70, p < .001, RMSEA = .062, CFI = .958, SRMR = .042. 
5 The path coefficients reported are from the unconstrained stacked model. 
6 No published study has attempted to manipulate more than one component of 
future self-connectedness. The only study to my knowledge that has is the Fall 
2016 pilot study for the IES project we used to develop the manipulation 
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Table 1. Types of temporal self-comparison
Self-Affirming Temporal Self-Comparison Self-Deflating Temporal Self-Comparison
Past Downward: Future Upward: Past Upward: Future Downward:
Your current self is 
better than your past 
self. You have gotten 
better.
Your future self is better 
than your current self. 
You will get better.
Your current self is worse 
than your past self. You 
used to be better.
Your future self 
will be worse than 
your current self. 
You will be worse.
Note: The description under each type of temporal self-comparison is provided to give a sense of 
what each of these comparisons would mean and what they might look like. There are multiple 
ways to express each, and keep in mind that these are comparisons, oftentimes in a specific 
domain. 
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Table 2. Summary of Waves and Measures Used in Study 1. 
Time 1 






Fall 2017  
Week 52
Future Self-Connectedness Future Self-Connectedness Future Self-Connectedness
Future Self-Vividness Future Self-Vividness Future Self-Vividness
Future Self-Positivity Future Self-Positivity Future Self-Positivity
Social Comparison Social Comparison





Academic Self-Efficacy Academic Self-Efficacy Academic Self-Efficacy
Academic Valuing
Academic Disengagement Academic Disengagement
Expected GPA Expected GPA
Likelihood of Graduation Likelihood of Graduation
Note: This table includes the measures used in Study 1. Measures in bold will be used in 
analyses.
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Downward Upward Direction Unspecified 





Nitems = 5 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .885
Nitems = 4 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .856
Nitems = 3 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .786
e.g., I am better than I 
used to be
e.g., I was a better student 
in the past
e.g., I compare who I am 
now to who I was when I 
was in high school





Nitems = 3 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .615
Nitems = 4 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .823
Nitems = 4 
Cronbach’s α T4 =.820
e.g., I am a better student 
now than I will be in the 
future
e.g., I think about how my 
future self will be better at 
things than I am right now
e.g., I measure myself 
against the person I will be 
in the future





Nitems = 4 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .841
Nitems = 3 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .889
Nitems = 4 
Cronbach’s α T4 = .861
e.g., I tend to compare 
myself to students who are 
not doing as well as I am 
in school
e.g., I compare myself to 
students who are better 
than I am in school
e.g., I think about how I 
am doing in school relative 
to my friends in school
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Table 4. Correlations among future self-connectedness, social comparison, and temporal 
self-comparison.  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD N
1. S-C - 4.16 1.19 549
2. Vivid .30*** - 4.66 1.48 549
3. Pos .28*** .46*** - 0.00 0.86 549
4. SCom -.04 -.21*** -.20*** - 4.58 1.12 504
5. PastDo .13* .20*** .27*** .08 † - 5.31 1.14 504
6. PastUp -.15** -.21*** -.23*** .18*** -.35*** - 4.01 1.37 504
7. FutDo -.14** -.23*** -.38*** .30*** -.25*** .45*** - 3.26 1.15 503
8. FutUp .07 .19*** .17** .07 .44*** -.02 -.12** 5.21 1.03 503
Note: S-C = similarity-connectedness at Time 1; Vivid = future self-vividness aggregate at Time 
1; Pos = future self-positivity aggregate at Time 1; SCom = social comparison at Time 2; PastDo 
= past-downward temporal self-comparison at Time 2; PastUp = past-upward temporal self-
comparison at Time 2; FutDo = future-downward temporal self-comparison at Time 2; FutUp = 
future-upward temporal self-comparison at Time 2.  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 5. Correlations of connectedness and comparison with primary outcome measures.  
Measure 1. S-C 2. Viv 3. Pos 4. SA TSC 5. SD TSC 6. SCom M SD N
ERQ .20** .13* .25*** .22** -.19** -.15** 3.82 .69 484
Esteem .27** .17** .30*** .15** -.19** -.09 † 3.47 .98 483
RSE .29** .22*** .36*** .18** -.39** -.21** 5.13 1.09 480
SWLS .24** .10 † .28*** .12* -.28** -.03 4.90 1.23 482
ASE .19** .25** .25*** .34** -.41** .02 5.37 .89 516
Disengage -.24** -.24** -.29*** -.33** .49** .11* 2.28 1.19 514
Value .06 .08 .18** .43** -.30** .03 5.84 .89 514
Grad .07 .12* .18** .25** -.24** .08 † 6.68 .82 508
Expect .15** .08 .17** .14** -.32** .11* 3.56 .37 510
Note: S-C = similarity-connectedness at Time 1; Viv = Vividness aggregate at Time 1; Pos = 
positivity aggregate at Time 1; SA TSC = self-affirming temporal self-comparison at Time 2; SD 
TSC = self-deflating temporal self-comparison at Time 2; SCom = social comparison at Time 2; 
ERQ = emotion regulation at Time 3; Esteem = single-item self-esteem at Time 3; RSE = 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale at Time 3; SWLS = satisfaction with life scale at Time 3; ASE = 
academic self-efficacy at Time 2; Disengage = academic disengagement at Time 2; value = 
academic valuing at Time 2; Grad = graduation likelihood at Time 2; Expect = expected GPA for 
that semester at Time 2.  † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 6. Study 1 exploratory analyses. Relation of single-item similarity and 
connectedness to comparison processes and outcomes of interest, for working sample and 
split by college generation status.  
Group Working Sample First-Generation Continuing-Generation
Measure Similar Connected Similar Connected Similar Connected
Social Comp .02 -.07 .17 † .08 -.04 -.13 †
Past Down .03 .16 ** .22 * .28 ** -.07 .10
Past Upward -.05 -.18 *** .03 -.21 * -.07 -.15 *
Future Down -.10 † -.14 * -.06 -.21 * -.12 † -.10
Future Upward .04 .07 .17 † .10 -.03 .04
Emotion Reg .15 ** .18 *** .24 * .38 *** .08 .07
Self-Esteem .19 ** .25 *** .08 .21 † .20 ** .23 ***
RSE .22 *** .27 *** .23 * .32 ** .18 ** .22 ***
Life Satisfaction .22 *** .19 *** .20 † .33 *** .22 *** .11 †
ASE .11 * .20 *** .14 .28 ** .07 .15 *
Disengagement -.18 *** -.21 *** -.26 ** -.34 *** -.13 * -.14 *
Valuing .06 .05 .08 .21 * .06 -.005
Grad Likely .05 .07 .14 .25 * -.02 -.04
Expected GPA .07 .17 ** .05 .29 ** .07 .09
Note: S-C = similarity-connectedness at Time 1; Viv = Vividness aggregate at Time 1; Pos = 
positivity aggregate at Time 1; SA TSC = self-affirming temporal self-comparison at Time 2; SD 
TSC = self-deflating temporal self-comparison at Time 2; SCom = social comparison at Time 2; 
ERQ = emotion regulation at Time 3; Esteem = single-item self-esteem at Time 3; RSE = 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale at Time 3; SWLS = satisfaction with life scale at Time 3; ASE = 
academic self-efficacy at Time 2; Disengage = academic disengagement at Time 2; value = 
academic valuing at Time 2; Grad = graduation likelihood at Time 2; Expect = expected GPA for 
that semester at Time 2.  † p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ . 01, *** p ≤ .001.
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Table 7. Exploratory analyses. Tests of whether constraining similarity and connectedness 
to be equal worsens model fit.  
Model 𝜒2 (df) CFI RMSEA SRMR ∆𝜒2(1) ∆𝜒2 p
Base Model, No Constraints 106.76 (32) .947 .056 .042 n/a n/a
Constraint: FSC on SCom 108.84 (32) .947 .055 .043 2.08 .15
Constraint: FSC on SA TSC 108.72 (33) .947 .055 .043 1.96 .16
Constraint: FSC on SD TSC 108.71 (33) .947 .055 .043 1.95 .16
Constraint: FSC on Motivation 107.33 (33) .948 .055 .042 .57 .45
Constraint: FSC on Adjustment 106.85 (33) .948 .054 .042 .09 .76
Constraint: FSC on EmoReg 106.98 (33) .948 .054 .042 .22 .64
Note: FSC1 = future self-similarity single item; FSC2 = future self-connectedness single 
item; SA TSC = self-affirming temporal self-comparison; SD TSC = self-deflating temporal 
self comparison; SCom = social comparison aggregate; adjustment = psychological 
adjustment latent variable; motivation = academic motivation latent variable; EmoReg = 
emotion regulation. Paths from FSC1 and FSC2 to criteria were individually constrained to 
be equal, denoted by “FSC.” Base model 
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Table 8. Study 1 exploratory analyses. Examination of moderation by college generation 
status for paths in Study 1B SEM.  
Model 𝜒2 (df) CFI RMSEA SRMR ∆𝜒2(1) ∆𝜒2 p
Base Model Fully Constrained 225.11 (100) .909 .058 .093 n/a n/a
Release Motivation on FSC1 224.98 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.13 .72
Release Motivation on FSC2 223.52 (999) .910 .058 .092 1.59 .21
Release Motivation SCom 225.11 (999) .909 .058 .093 0 1.0
Release Motivation on SA TSC 224.90 (999) .909 .058 .093 0.21 .65
Release Motivation on SD TSC 225.10 (999) .909 .058 .093 0.01 .92
Release EmoReg on FSC1 224.27 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.84 .36
Release EmoReg on FSC2 220.23 (999) .912 .057 .090 4.88 .03
Release EmoReg SCom 224.92 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.19 .66
Release EmoReg on SA TSC 225.06 (999) .909 .058 .093 0.05 .82
Release EmoReg on SD TSC 223.73 (999) .910 .058 .094 1.38 .24
Release Adjustment on FSC1 224.93 (999) .909 .058 .093 0.18 .67
Release Adjustment on FSC2 224.97 (999) .909 .058 .093 0.14 .71
Release Adjustment SCom 223.54 (999) .910 .058 .091 1.57 .15
Release Adjustment on SA TSC 221.05 (999) .912 .057 .089 4.06 .04
Release Adjustment on SD TSC 220.67 (999) .912 .057 .087 4.44 .04
Release SA TSC on FSC1 218.28 (999) .914 .057 .088 6.83 .008
Release SA TSC on FSC2 224.32 (999) .909 .058 .090 0.79 .37
Release SA TSC with SD TSC 224.24 (999) .909 .058 .091 0.87 .35
Release SA TSC with SCOM 224.89 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.22 .64
Release SD TSC with SCOM 224.95 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.16 .69
Release SD TSC on FSC1 224.16 (999) .909 .058 .094 0.95 .33
Release SD TSC on FSC2 223.72 (999) .910 .058 .091 1.39 .24
Release SCom on FSC1 223.27 (999) .910 .058 .092 1.84 .17
Release SCom on FSC2 221.11 (999) .911 .057 .093 4 .05
Release FSC1 with FSC2 218.74 (999) .913 .057 .088 6.37 .01
Release Motivation with 
EmoReg
224.61 (999) .909 .058 .092 0.5 .48
Release Motivation with 
Adjustment
224.05 (999) .909 .058 .091 1.06 .30
Release EmoReg with 
Adjustment
224.93 (999) 0.910 0.059 0.095 0.19 0.68
Note: FSC1 = future self-similarity single item; FSC2 = future self-connectedness single 
item; SA TSC = self-affirming temporal self-comparison; SD TSC = self-deflating temporal 
self comparison; SCom = social comparison aggregate; adjustment = psychological 
adjustment latent variable; motivation = academic motivation latent variable; EmoReg = 
emotion regulation. Base model was the stacked model from exploratory analyses with all 
paths constrained to be equal for first-generation and continuing-generation college students. 
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Table 9. Study 2. Experimental effects of condition on future self-connectedness.  
Measure Control FSC IS ANOVA
S-C Aggregate 4.13 (1.31) 4.23 (1.19) 4.14 (1.20) F(2,425) = .31, p = .74
Positivity Aggregate 5.59 (1.15) 5.70 (.88) 5.73 (.95) F(2,425) = .81, p = .45
Vividness Aggregate 4.48 (1.47) 4.64 (1.52) 4.62 (1.35) F(2,423) = .53, p = .59
Similarity 4.11 (1.38) 4.20 (1.30) 4.12 (1.23) F(2,424) = .19, p = .83
Connectedness 4.14 (1.56) 4.27 (1.42) 4.16 (1.48) F(2,424) = .32, p = .73
Future Self Liking 5.54 (1.39) 5.69 (1.17) 5.68 (1.13) F(2,424) = .58, p = .56
Positivity 100 74.22 (21.26) 77.71 (17.02) 74.29 (18.69) F(2,422) = 1.51, p = .22
Positivity 7 5.65 (1.22) 5.71 (1.02) 5.78 (1.06) F(2,423) = .48, p = .62
Vividness 4.47 (1.59) 4.61 (1.57) 4.50 (1.43) F(2,423) = .30, p = .74
Ease 4.49 (1.45) 4.68 (1.59) 4.74 (1.45) F(2,423) = 1.12, p = .33
Note: Table describes means and standard deviations of future self-connectedness measures 
according to experimental condition; FSC = pilot future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = 
identity-stability manipulation. S-C Aggregate = similarity-connectedness aggregate measure; 
Positivity 100 = negativity-positivity on a 100-point scale; Positivity 7 = negativity-positivity on 
a seven-point scale; Ease = ease of creating mental imagery of the future.
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Table 10. Study 2. Experimental effects on social comparison and temporal self-
comparison.  
Measure Control FSC IS ANOVA Contrast
Social Comparison 4.76 (1.08) 4.64 (1.11) 4.87 (.96) F(2, 426) = 1.67
Self-Affirming TSC 5.26 (.87) 5.33 (.79) 5.30 (.69) F(2, 426) = .23
Self-Deflating TSC 3.92 (1.03) 3.77 (.95) 4.01 (.83) F(2,426) = 2.50 † 4* 5*
SC unspecified 4.96 (1.18) 4.86 (1.23) 5.09 (1.03) F(2, 426) = 1.42
SC upward 4.49 (1.21) 4.34 (1.18) 4.52 (1.14) F(2, 426) = .88
SC downward 4.86 (1.28) 4.74 (1.25) 5.05 (1.22) F(2, 426) = 2.23
TSC future unspec 5.35 (.90) 5.42 (.86) 5.33 (.89) F(2, 426) = .38
TSC future down 3.47 (1.09) 3.32 (1.06) 3.48 (.98) F(2, 426) = 1.10
TSC future up 5.39 (.97) 5.54 (.93) 5.50 (.79) F(2, 426) = 1.06
TSC past unspec 5.19 (.96) 5.27 (.90) 5.23 (.92) F(2, 426) = .23
TSC past down 5.17 (1.04) 5.16 (1.02) 5.15 (.87) F(2, 426) = .01
TSC past up 4.25 (1.31) 4.10 (1.23) 4.41 (1.08) F(2,426) = 2.36 † 4* 5†
Note: Table describes means and standard deviations of comparison measures according to 
experimental condition; FSC = pilot future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = identity-
stability manipulation. Self-Affirming TSC = self-affirming temporal self-comparison; Self-
Deflating TSC = self-deflating temporal self-comparison; SC unspecified = social comparison, 
unspecified direction; SC upward = upward social comparison; SC downward = downward 
social comparison; TSC future unspec = temporal self-comparison with the future self, direction 
unspecified; TSC future down = future-downward temporal self-comparison; TSC future up = 
future-upward temporal self-comparison; TSC past unspec = temporal self-comparison with the 
past self, direction unspecified; TSC past down = past-downward temporal self-comparison; 
TSC past up = past-upward temporal self-comparison. Contrasts = significant and marginally 
significant contrast tests, 1 = control vs. both manipulations, 2 = control vs. pilot connectedness 
manipulation, 3 = control vs. identity-stability manipulation, 4 = connectedness vs. identity-
stability; 5 = connectedness vs. control and identity-stability. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, 
*** p < .001.
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Table 11. Study 2. Experimental effects on motivation, emotion, and well-being.  
Measure Control FSC IS ANOVA Contrast
Emotion Regulation 3.66 (.78) 3.68 (.69) 3.61 (.73) F(2, 421) = .40
Satisfaction with Life 4.71 (1.26) 4.62 (1.20) 4.74 (1.19) F(2, 423) = .36
Rosenberg Self-Esteem 4.77 (1.21) 4.95 (1.17) 4.92 (1.13) F(2, 420) = .92
Self-Esteem 1-item 3.26 (1.13) 3.31 (.93) 3.33 (1.05) F(2, 421) = .18
Academic Self-Efficacy 4.99 (.97) 5.18 (.91) 5.06 (.92) F(2, 414) = 1.54
Academic Valuing 5.94 (.86) 5.85 (.97) 5.86 (.94) F(2, 420) = .35
Academic 
Disengagement
2.35 (1.31) 2.40 (1.39) 2.21 (1.13) F(2, 420) = .85
Expected GPA 3.45 (.42) 3.56 (.36) 3.53 (.38) F(2, 420) = 2.89 † 1* 2* 3† 5†
Graduation Likely 6.62 (.72) 6.60 (.90) 6.67 (.69) F(2, 420) = .39 1* 2* 3† 5†
Note: Table describes means and standard deviations of comparison measures according to 
experimental condition; FSC = pilot future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = identity-
stability manipulation. Contrasts = significant and marginally significant contrast tests, 1 = 
control vs. both manipulations, 2 = control vs. pilot connectedness manipulation, 3 = control vs. 
identity-stability manipulation, 4 = connectedness vs. identity-stability; 5 = connectedness vs. 
control and identity-stability.  † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 12. Study 2. Experimental effects of condition on mood. 
Measure Control FSC IS ANOVA Contrast
Positive Affect 1.90 (.86) 1.82 (.81) 1.86 (.77) F(2, 414) = .33
Negative Affect 2.92 (.95) 2.98 (.86) 2.95 (.92) F(2, 414) = .15
Distressed 2.55 (1.20) 2.33 (1.13) 2.53 (1.16) F(2, 414) = 1.58
Excited 2.73 (1.27) 2.69 (1.19) 2.69 (1.19) F(2, 414) = .06
Upset 2.14 (1.21) 1.95 (1.11) 2.01 (1.09) F(2, 414) = 1.08
Guilty 1.70 (1.11) 1.76 (1.18) 1.73 (1.03) F(2, 414) = .11
Scared 1.98 (1.18) 2.01 (1.21) 2.08 (1.24) F(2, 414) = .29
Hostile 1.47 (.90) 1.54 (1.01) 1.54 (.96) F(2, 413) = .25
Enthusiastic 2.66 (1.32) 2.71 (1.22) 2.73 (1.25) F(2, 414) = .10
Proud 2.83 (1.31) 2.75 (1.19) 2.82 (1.23) F(2, 414) = .20
Irritable 2.22 (1.18) 2.31 (1.21) 2.13 (1.18) F(2, 414) = .75
Alert 2.73 (1.25) 2.96 (1.24) 2.73 (1.25) F(2, 414) = 1.57
Ashamed 1.85 (1.24) 1.63 (1.05) 1.65 (1.04) F(2, 414) = 1.69
Inspired 2.84 (1.42) 2.96 (1.28) 2.78 (1.27) F(2, 414) = .63
Nervous 2.58 (1.37) 2.33 (1.21) 2.56 (1.27) F(2, 414) = 1.61
Determined 3.39 (1.27) 3.49 (1.14) 3.54 (1.16) F(2, 414) = .60
Attentive 3.19 (1.17) 3.16 (1.15) 3.17 (1.10) F(2, 414) = .03
Active 3.02 (1.41) 3.09 (1.31) 3.06 (1.26) F(2, 414) = .09
Afriad 2.00 (1.22) 1.89 (1.21) 1.94 (1.24) F(2, 414) = .29
Disgusted 1.60 (1.14) 1.51 (.98) 1.51 (.94) F(2, 414) = .40
Threatened 1.48 (1.02) 1.46 (.97) 1.33 (.72) F(2, 414) = 1.08
In Control 2.91 (1.23) 3.07 (1.18) 2.99 (1.23) F(2, 413) = .60
Helpless 1.96 (1.28) 1.58 (.98) 1.88 (1.10) F(2, 414) = 4.18* 1† 2**4* 5**
Angry 1.67 (1.09) 1.67 (1.13) 1.59 (.94) F(2, 414) = .27
Aggressive 1.45 (.89) 1.59 (1.12) 1.53 (.92) F(2, 414) = .74
Note: FSC = pilot future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = identity-stability manipulation. 
Contrasts = significant and marginally significant contrast tests, 1 = control vs. both 
manipulations, 2 = control vs. pilot connectedness manipulation, 3 = control vs. identity-stability 
manipulation, 4 = connectedness vs. identity-stability; 5 = connectedness vs. control and 
identity-stability.  † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 13. Study 2. Measures of future self-connectedness before and after manipulation.   
Measure Control FSC IS
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
S-C Aggregate 3.76 (1.12) 4.04 (1.09) 3.95 (1.20) 4.09 (1.29) 4.20 (1.12) 4.18 (1.20)
Similarity 3.88 (1.17) 4.08 (.104) 3.91 (1.38) 4.14 (1.28) 4.29 (1.21) 4.32 (1.22)
Connectedness 3.64 (1.55) 4.00 (1.41) 4.00 (1.38) 4.05 (1.43) 4.11 (1.26) 4.04 (1.40)
Positivity Agg 5.72 (.90) 5.50 (1.06) 5.84 (.89) 5.91 (.78) 5.77 (.92) 5.66 (.89)
Liking 5.64 (1.11) 5.44 (1.33) 5.55 (1.22) 6.09 (1.11) 5.61 (1.29) 5.57 (1.14)











Positivity 7 5.80 (.96) 5.56 (1.12) 6.14 (.77) 5.73 (1.08) 5.89 (.92) 5.75 (.93)
Vividness Agg 4.96 (1.43) 4.30 (1.38) 4.77 (1.24) 4.86 (1.46) 4.34 (1.56) 4.23 (1.37)
Vividness 5.00 (1.38) 4.40 (1.41) 4.68 (1.49) 4.82 (1.62) 4.25 (1.67) 4.04 (1.53)
Ease 4.92 (1.63) 4.20 (1.44) 4.86 (1.25) 4.91 (1.34) 4.43 (1.60) 4.43 (1.43)
Note: Table describes means and standard deviations of future self-connectedness measures 
according to experimental condition and pre-manipulation vs. post-manipulation; FSC = pilot 
future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = identity-stability manipulation. Pre = PSY 101 
questionnaire at Week 3; Post = Study 2 survey after experimental condition at Week 6. S-C 
Aggregate = similarity-connectedness aggregate measure; Positivity Agg = positivity aggregate 
measure; Vividness Agg = vividness aggregate measure; Liking = Liking of the future self; 
Positivity 100 = negativity-positivity on a 100-point scale; Positivity 7 = negativity-positivity on 
a seven-point scale; Ease = ease of creating mental imagery of the future.
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Table 14. Study 2. Pre-manipulation differences in future self-connectedness by 
condition.  
Control FSC IS Effect Size (d)





S-C Aggregate 1.16 3.76 (1.12) 3.95 (1.20) 4.20 (1.12) 0.16 0.38 0.22
Similarity 1.25 3.88 (1.17) 3.91 (1.38) 4.29 (1.21) 0.02 0.33 0.30
Connectedness 1.26 3.64 (1.55) 4.00 (1.38) 4.11 (1.26) 0.29 0.37 0.09
Positivity Agg .927 5.72 (.90) 5.84 (.89) 5.77 (.92) 0.13 0.05 0.08
Liking 1.20 5.64 (1.11) 5.55 (1.22) 5.61 (1.29) 0.07 0.02 0.05
Positivity 100 16.57 74.08 (19.04) 80.10 (13.96) 76.75 (16.53) 0.36 0.16 0.20
Positivity 7 .906 5.80 (.96) 6.14 (.77) 5.89 (.92) 0.38 0.10 0.28
Vividness Agg 1.44 4.96 (1.43) 4.77 (1.24) 4.34 (1.56) 0.13 0.43 0.30
Vividness 1.55 5.00 (1.38) 4.68 (1.49) 4.25 (1.67) 0.21 0.48 0.28
Ease 1.52 4.92 (1.63) 4.86 (1.25) 4.43 (1.60) 0.04 0.32 0.28
Note: Table describes means and standard deviations of pre-manipulations future self-
connectedness measures according to experimental condition. In addition, differences among 
means are given in Cohen’s d. FSC = pilot future self-connectedness manipulation; IS = identity-
stability manipulation. Pre = PSY 101 questionnaire. S-C Aggregate = similarity-connectedness 
aggregate measure; Positivity Agg = positivity aggregate measure; Vividness Agg = vividness 
aggregate measure; Liking = Liking of the future self; Positivity 100 = negativity-positivity on a 
100-point scale; Positivity 7 = negativity-positivity on a seven-point scale; Ease = ease of 





Figure 1. Simplified structural model of SEM in Study 1B. This model is intended to 
convey the main hypotheses in a clear, concise manner by grouping the future self-
connectedness measures together and the temporal self-comparison measures together. 
Dotted lines indicate paths predicted to be negative.  
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Figure 2. Structural equation model for Study 1B with three separate components of 
future self-connectedness. Path coefficients are not given. Black lines represent 
significant or marginally significant paths. Green lines represent nonsignificant paths. 
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Figure 3. Structural equation model for exploratory analyses in Study 1B. This model 
examines the effects of single-item future self-similarity and single-item future self-
connectedness in lieu of the other future self-connectedness measures. Blue lines indicate 
significant paths, gray lines indicate nonsignificant paths, dotted lines indicate negative 
relations, and solid lines indicate positive relations. Unstandardized path coefficients are 
given with standardized path coefficients in parentheses. 
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Figure 4. Structural equation model Study 1 exploratory analyses, stacked by college 
generation status. Blue lines indicate significant paths, gray lines indicate nonsignificant 
paths, and black lines indicate paths moderated by college generation status. Path 
coefficients, with standardized coefficients in parentheses, are provided separately for 
first- and continuing-generation college students. 
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Figure 5. The interaction of vividness and similarity-connectedness predicting past-
downward temporal self-comparison. The figure depicts the relation between vividness 
(x-axis) and past-downward temporal self-comparison (y-axis) at different levels of 
similarity-connectedness (blue line = low similarity at -1 SD, black line = high similarity 






















Figure 6. The interaction of vividness and similarity-connectedness predicting past-
downward temporal self-comparison. The figure depicts the relation between similarity-
connectedness (x-axis) and past-downward temporal self-comparison (y-axis) at different 























Figure 7. The interaction of positivity and similarity-connectedness predicting past-
downward temporal self-comparison. The figure depicts the relation between positivity 
(x-axis) and past-downward temporal self-comparison (y-axis) at different levels of 
similarity-connectedness (blue line = low similarity at -1 SD, black line = high similarity 






















Figure 8. The interaction of positivity and similarity-connectedness predicting past-
downward temporal self-comparison. The figure depicts the relation between similarity-
connectedness (x-axis) and past-downward temporal self-comparison (y-axis) at different 
levels of positivity (blue line = low positivity at -1 SD, black line = high positivity at +1 
SD). 
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